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ABSTRACT
Over the past half-century, the physical form and primary purpose of the American urban waterfront
has profoundly changed. Due to the combined forces of de-industrialization, globalization, and
military restructuring, urban waterfronts have transformed from industrial and manufacturing
employment centers to tourist destinations, passive recreation areas, and luxury residential and
corporate office districts. The wave of redevelopment efforts has resulted in a general sameness,
both in physical design and economic function, across all urban waterfronts. The possibility of an
integrated waterfront, in which traditional industrial and manufacturing uses intermingle with
spaces for new non-industrial capital investment and public recreation and waterfront access, is
the focus of this research.
Using the Philadelphia Navy Yard as its primary case study, this research explores the spatial
dimensions of contemporary waterfront planning in a changing economic landscape. The research
attempts to answer the following questions: Can a city effectively integrate industrial use, new
capital investment, and public open space on its waterfront through specific regulations and site
design? Does this form of waterfront redevelopment present a viable and meaningful alternative
to the standard development models of the past? Through an in depth study of the Navy Yard's
economic development policies and design principles, this thesis argues that such goals are difficult
to achieve in the American planning and design process, which prioritizes capital investment over
other waterfront functions. Nonetheless, the attempt at integration proves that it is possible to
diversify our understanding of the contemporary waterfront and its place in urban development.
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CHAPTER 1:
THE CHANGING FORM OF
URBAN WATERFRONTS
This research explores the spatial dimensions of contemporary
waterfront planning in a changing economic landscape through
a comprehensive study of the redevelopment of the Philadelphia
Navy Yard. The research attempts to answer two related questions:
Can a city effectively integrate industrial use, new capital
investment, and public open space on its waterfront through
specific regulations and site design? Does this form of waterfront
redevelopment present a viable and meaningful alternative to
the standard development models of the past? Through an in
depth study of the Navy Yard's economic development policies
and design principles, this thesis argues that integrating such
disparate uses is difficult to achieve in the American planning and
design process, which prioritizes capital investment over other
waterfront functions. Nonetheless, the attempt at integration
proves that it is possible to diversify our understanding of the
contemporary waterfront and its place in urban development.
WATERFRONT PLANNING IN CONTEXT
The combined forces of de-industrialization, globalization,
and, in some cases, military restructuring over the past few
decades have had a profound effect on the spatial organization
of American cities. Waterfronts in particular have undergone
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significant physical transformation, from industrial and
manufacturing employment centers to tourist destinations,
recreation areas, and luxury residential districts. For many
American cities, the waterfront was the genesis of the settlement;
they were locations of production and transportation of goods
and essential to the industrial economy of the 19* and early 2 0 th
centuries. Economic changes and demographic shifts in the mid-
twentieth century fundamentally shifted this purpose. As both
industry and residents left the city for the surrounding suburbs,
many cities began to use the redevelopment of the waterfront
as a visible place for creation of meaning and identity (Marshall
2001, 5). Since that time, academic and professional interest in
the redevelopment of waterfronts has grown exponentially, to
the point where it is nearly its own discipline within the field
of planning and urban design (Malone 1996, 4). Waterfront
development literature can generally be divided into two
camps: academic studies which analyze the political, social, and
economic context of waterfront projects, and more celebratory,
illustrated volumes with descriptive articles about particular
locations (Desorf and Laidley 2011, 4).1 Studies of waterfront
development also vary as to their adherence to particular
theoretical frameworks, including neoliberal or neo-Marxist
economic philosophy or New Urbanist design critiques. 2 The
study of the waterfront redevelopment process is therefore not
tied to one particular school of thought, but is used to ground the
study of different theories and practices of urban redevelopment
in a physical place.
The prevalence of academic and professional literature
indicates that, over the past half-century, the reclamation of the
waterfront has become a familiar site for both public and private
1 Frequently cited academic studies include those by Malone (1997) and
Hoyle et al. (1988). The more celebratory works include those by Bruttomesso
(1993), Breen and Rigby (1996), and Marshall (2001).
2 Desorf and Laidley's book, for example, takes an implicitly neo-Marxist
approach to the waterfront, grounding their study in earlier works by Manuel
Castells and David Harvey.
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investment in the city. However, over time the form and means
of that investment has shifted, mirroring wider patterns in urban
development. As Malone argues:
"Neither the factors that have created the
opportunities for redevelopment, nor the
processes of renewal, fall outside the common
frameworks for urban development. In this
respect the waterfront is not unique. It is a new (or
retrieved) frontier for conventional development
processes; albeit that these processes change over
time. Both the types of development and the forms
of capital that have colonized the waterfront are
common to other parts of the urban structure."
(Malone 1996, 2-3)
The popularity of the waterfront as a point of analysis is due to
it being one of most visible spaces for the manifestation of these
political and economic forces (Marshall 2011, 5). Particular
waterfront projects, such Baltimore's Inner Harbor or the London
Docklands, have come to symbolize particular means and forms
of development, and are referenced frequently in the literature.
The initial waterfront redevelopment projects were a response
to both the deindustrialization of the waterfront and the decline
of the city's downtowns. Baltimore's Inner Harbor, planning for
which began in 1965, is widely considered the "first of the modern
waterfronts" (Shaw 2001, 163). The redevelopment of the Inner
Harbor was primarily a public sector led initiative, in which a
centralized city government and a powerful and committed
mayor attempted to combat the city's decline. The Harborplace
festival-market and aquarium anchored the development and
"embedded the area in local consciousness, and so attracted
further development" (ibid) (Figure 1.1). The success of the
Inner Harbor, which draws millions of visitors a year, influenced
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cities across the country and inspired a wave of
waterfront projects over the next few decades.
The next phase of waterfront projects attempted to
replicate the success of the Inner Harbor, but with
a much-reduced role for the central government.
The 1980s saw a number of waterfront projects
led by quasi-public or wholly private entities that
were set up specifically to develop waterfront areas.
Figure 1.1 Baltimore's Inner Harbor
(By Iracaz CC-BY-SA-3.0 via Wikimedia Commons) The London Docklands Development Corporation
(LDDC), which oversaw the development of Canary
Wharf in London, is perhaps the best known of
these (Figure 1.2). While all development projects require a
balance of public-sector regulatory power and private-sector
financial investment, the post-Baltimore waterfront projects saw
that balance shift more towards the latter than the former. These
projects reflected neoliberal economic development principles,
and rejected the top-down, public sector led efforts that
characterized efforts like those in Baltimore just a decade earlier
(Shaw 2001, 165). These projects also differed from earlier efforts
in their primary purpose and means for achieving
it; earlier efforts used festival markets and other
recreational amenities to encourage people to
return to the downtown (with the expectation that
such activity would entice office and residential
development) whereas the LDDC took a much
more direct approach to incentivizing business
development; it was among the first to use enterprise
zones and other tax and financial incentives to lure
Figure 1.2 Canary Wharf, London businesses to the waterfront (Brownill 2011, 125).
(By Diliff CC-BY-SA-3.0 via Wikimedia Commons) Even the bankruptcy of the LDDC in the early
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1990s did not lessen the popularity of the quasi-
public development corporation (Shaw 2001, 165).
Learning from past efforts, many recent waterfront
projects have attempted to blend both public and
private roles in the redevelopment and public and
private purpose in the site. Massive waterfront
projects, like the HafenCity development in
Hamburg, boast complete public waterfront
Fi~
access and recreation activities as well as millions (By San A
of square feet of new residential and commercial
development, while being run by large public-
private partnerships (Desorf 2011, 2) (Figure 1.3). Indeed,
providing space for new capital investment and ensuring a
wealth of public open space, trails, and access have both come
to be expected characteristics of all urban waterfronts. Yet the
working waterfront is still a vital part of the regional economy, as
it helps diversify the economic base and provide jobs for a wide
range of skill sets. As the expectation for a public, consumption-
driven recreational waterfront becomes evermore ensconced in
the view of political elites and the public at large, the challenge
of maintaining the waterfront as a space of diverse economic
activity and programmed space remains.
FOUR STANDARD WATERFRONT FORMS
Even as the political means for waterfront development have
evolved over the past half-century, the forms those waterfronts
take have remained fairly static. After examining a wide survey
of waterfront conditions, I posit that four standard forms of
urban waterfronts currently exist: the forgotten or underutilized
gure 1.3 HafenCity, Hamburg
ndreas CC-BY-SA-3.0 via Wikimedia
Commons)
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Figure 1.4 Lower Schuylkill River, P
I (PIDC)
post-industrial waterfront, the industrial working waterfront,
the pastoral passive park, and the consumption-driven
festive market. These forms have developed either organically
through market forces and/or in interaction with deliberate
redevelopment planning processes; while there has generally
been a progression away from the industrial employment center
and the post-industrial wasteland to the pastoral park and
festive market forms, these forms do not adhere to a particular
timeframe (Breen and Rigby 1996, 20). Most important, these
different waterfront forms are almost always completely distinct
from one another. For example, little attempt has been made to
integrate working waterfront forms with the festive marketplace.
The following figures illustrate the four standard waterfront
forms. Each is drawn from one city - Philadelphia - to
demonstrate how these forms exist simultaneously but physically
separated from one another. The lower Schuylkill River is typical
of the forgotten or underutilized post-industrial waterfront
model that inspired much of the revitalization efforts of the
past decades (Figure 1.4). While not necessarily
wholly abandoned, this waterfront model is
characterized by a patchwork of low-value uses,
like storage facilities and parking lots, alongside
publicly inhospitable uses like refineries and waste
incinerators. These waterfronts usually are marked
by the infrastructure of past industry, like highways
and railroads. Generally considered unpleasant and
under-used, when considered at all, the forgotten
waterfront nonetheless offers an important element
hiladelphia of discovery and potential to city environments.
Despite the decades of industrial decline that led to
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many waterfront redevelopment projects, working
waterfronts like the Port of Philadelphia (Figure
1.5) are still sites of industrial employment. This
model is used by particular industries - especially
shipping and fishing - which are wholly water
dependent. They are characterized by particular
infrastructure - cranes, railroads, and large dry
docks - and activities that exclude public access,
even while they remain active spaces for work and
prodution.Fi~economic production. (Phila
The two other forms are friendlier to public access.
The peaceful waterfront path that follows the Upper Schuylkill
River in Philadelphia (Figure 1.6) is representative of the
pastoral, passive waterfront park model. Its primary purpose
is one of tranquil contemplation and waterfront vistas, made
possible through modest landscaping, benches and other seating
areas, and a meandering path for walking or jogging. The passive
waterfront trail has come to be an expected feature any waterfront
redevelopment effort, as the waterfront has shifted from a
space for production and trade to public access
and enjoyment. More active recreation facilities
meant for major events can be found at Penn's
Landing (Figure 1.7) in Center City Philadelphia.
With its large amphitheater, nearby museums and
restaurants, and near-constant programming,
Penn's Landing is typical of the festival market
model of waterfront development. The large-scale
public recreation facilities of the festival waterfront
are frequently used to spur development of Figure
residential and commercial activity around it. Like (By Jeffrey M.
gure 1.5 Port of Philadelphia
Jelphia Regional Port Authority)
1.6 Schuylkill River Banks Park
Vinocur CC-BY-SA-2.5 via Wikimedia
Commons)
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Figure 1.7 Penn's Landing
(Delaware River Waterfront Corp
the passive waterfront park, this model has become
ubiquitous, generating a sameness of look and feel
across many different types of cities.
The persistent replication of these four models from
place to place may have exhausted the inherent
possibilities of each; a new synthesis is beginning to
be pursued that seeks a more diverse understanding
of what the waterfront can be. I propose a new
oration) model, one I call the integrated waterfront. The
integrated waterfront blends elements of the
forgotten, working, open, and festive waterfront
models to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.
This is not just a matter of promoting mixed-use developments,
whereby the waterfront becomes a backdrop for high-density
commercial and residential development for a specified range of
users. The integrated waterfront model repurposes the divergent
advantages of the waterfront site across a range of uses and
amenities. In this way it offers the possibility of a sustainable
economic development model with a positive and unique city-
specific identity. While cities and states have put forward policies
intended to retain industrial maritime uses on urban waterfronts
(such as the Designated Port Areas in Massachusetts or New
York City's recent adoption of the Vision2020 plan), very few
examples exist of the integration of multiple uses on a single
waterfront site. The Philadelphia Navy Yard, the primary case
study of this thesis, illustrates the challenges to achieving the
promise of this model.
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CASE STUDY RESEARCH METHOD & THESIS
ORGANIZATION
This thesis is the result of a qualitative study ofwaterfront planning
and design and economic development theory and policy. The
secondary literature mentioned in the preceding sections and in
the following chapters provided the theoretical underpinnings for
a close examination of one particular waterfront redevelopment
project. The Philadelphia Navy Yard, a 1,200-acre commercial
and industrial campus in South Philadelphia, serves as the
primary case study for this research. Decommissioned as a Naval
Base in 1996, its ownership was transferred to the quasi-public
Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC),
which undertook a master planning process in 2004. Currently,
the campus is home to 115 companies housed in a mix of newly
constructed factories and offices and renovated historic buildings,
with additional commercial and new residential development
still slated for construction.
The Navy Yard presents a dynamic case for studying multi-
functional waterfront spaces, and was chosen for this study
for a number of reasons. While not necessarily typical of all
waterfront redevelopment projects, the size and scale of the site
and the fact that it was entirely publicly owned presents a case in
which the City can experiment with a range of waterfront uses
and forms. Likewise, the recent timeframe of its transformation
allows the consideration of both the successes it has achieved
thus far as well as an examination of the ways in which it has
adapted the site to changing circumstance. Finally, unlike many
waterfront redevelopment projects of recent years, the protection
and promotion of industrial uses at the Navy Yard was a central
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element of the Plan. By attempting to blend this goal with that of
more traditional economic development and public open space
provision, the Navy Yard is a particularly interesting example of
the potential of the integrated waterfront model.
In studying the Navy Yard, I refer extensively to the 2004 Master
Plan and to a series of focused interviews I conducted with six
high-level individuals involved in the Navy Yard's development
and operation. They are:
. John Grady, President, Philadelphia Industrial
Development Corporation
. Mark Seltzer, Director of Management and
Development for the Navy Yard, Philadelphia Industrial
Development Corporation
. Brian Berson, Director of Leasing and Development
for the Navy Yard, Liberty Property Trust
* Graham Wyatt, Principle, Robert A. M. Stern &
Associates Architects (Principle designer for Navy Yard
Master Plan)
. Joe Hare, Director of Shipyard Operations, Rhoads
Industries (Navy Yard tenant)
. Dave Ziel, Chief Development Officer, URBN (Navy
Yard tenant)
The interviews were conducted in January and February of
2012 and often involved follow up exchanges over email. The
knowledge generated from these interviews was augmented with
that gained reading news and opinion articles from local media
outlets written over the course of the Navy Yard's development.
Finally, my personal observations and photographs from a series
of visits I conducted to the Navy Yard in August 2011, November
2011, and February 2012 provide an additional layer of analysis
to the case study.
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The study of the Philadelphia Navy Yard is organized into three
chapters, each exploring a different facet of the Navy Yard's
design and development and drawing connections to the wider
patterns of waterfront planning in the United States. The next
chapter outlines the history of the Philadelphia Navy Yard,
beginning with its role as an employment base and regional
industrial anchor for much of the 20t century. It explores the
political and economic ramifications of the Department of
Defense's decision in the early 1990s to close the Naval Base, the
City's initial plans for its reuse, and its transfer of ownership to
the Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC)
in 2000. An analysis of the 2004 Master Plan focuses on the
major players in the site's redevelopment, their objectives for
the planning process, and the outcomes of those efforts. Finally,
the chapter provides context to the efforts in Philadelphia by
comparing the objectives and design to similar projects in Boston
(the Boston Marine Industrial Park in the recently redeveloped
Seaport District) and Washington, DC (the Yards, formerly part
of the Washington Navy Yard). The BMIP supports exclusively
water-dependent industrial uses and the Yards provides a mix
of residential and high-end office space. The two projects, both
of which are located on former military bases, are representative
of more standard forms of waterfront districts and provide a
valuable comparison to the Philadelphia Navy Yard.
The third and fourth chapters go into a deeper analysis of the
two major functions that the redeveloped Navy Yard is intended
to perform: as a campus-like environment for both industrial
and non-industrial businesses, and as a public park providing
waterfront access and recreation to the City's residents. These
purposes parallel three of four standard waterfront forms
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discussed earlier: the industrial employment center, the
pastoral open green space, and the consumption-based festive
destination. Chapter Three will outline the strategies PIDC
has employed to retain and attract businesses to the site. These
strategies are discussed in the context of wider patterns of
economic development policy in the United States, particularly
the increased competition for businesses between and among
cities. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the urban design
implications of these strategies, specifically the ways in which
the different users interact with each other and the physical
environment of the site. The fourth chapter follows the same
general outline as the third, but focuses on the public spaces
in the Navy Yard and how they contribute to the Plan's stated
objectives. The site employs a mix of open parkland and trails
and more programmed active spaces, some of which have been
fully built out and some of which are still in the planning stages.
These spaces will be discussed within the context of the accepted
waterfront redevelopment paradigm, which emphasizes complete
public access. The chapter examinees how these public spaces
contribute to or hinder the (private) interests of the businesses in
the Navy Yard, with a particular emphasis on security concerns
and parking and transit issues.
The final chapter assesses the success with which the Philadelphia
Navy Yard, as it has been developed thus far, has integrated its
industrial uses, new business, and public open space along the
waterfront. It examines how much of the development of the site
has been a true synthesis of the three typical forms, and how
much these forms are still distinct and separate. It also offers
some conclusions as to the inherent conflicts of the integrated
waterfront model, specifically mixing industrial and non-
18
industrial uses and promoting both public space and private
use in one location. Finally, it offers some projections and
recommendations for future waterfront redevelopment efforts
that attempt to embrace the integrated waterfront model.
19
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CHAPTER 2:
THE NAVY YARD IN CONTEXT
GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
"Of all the institutions of the city, [the Navy Yard]
may well have been the most important, and
certainly the most overlooked."
- Buzz Bissinger, A Prayer for the City
Located approximately three miles due south of Center City
Philadelphia at the confluence of the Schuylkill and Delaware
Rivers, the Philadelphia Navy Yard has played a significant role in
both United States military history and the economic growth of
its city (Figure 2.1). Encompassing nearly 1,200 acres, the Navy
Yard occupies almost as much land as the City's Central Business
District and in its heyday was nearly as important for the city's
economic production. Its history as both shipyard and naval base
has given the site an unusual mix of architectural
and landscape features; the heavy industrial
equipment of the shipyard sits adjacent to a line of
charming, turn-of-the-century officers' housing,
while the far east end features an abandoned
airplane hanger lying next to deserted workers'
quarters overrun with weeds. Unlike the Delaware
and Schuylkill River waterfronts that frame Center
City, the Navy Yard's waterfront was rarely seen by
most Philadelphia residents. Yet its importance to Figure 2.1: The Navy Yard within the Conext of
the city's economy over the centuries has given it a Southern Philadelphia
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special place in the city's identity.
The first shipyard built for the newly established U.S. Navy, the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (PNSY) was constructed in 1801 at
the base of Front Street in the heart of the city. In response to
the rapid growth of the city during the 1 9 th century, the shipyard
moved to its current location on the swampy League Island
in 1871. The remote location and inhospitable environment
provided the Navy with a natural security system that was
compounded by the city's infrastructure investments over the
years. These included the freight rail yard that served the nearby
Port of Philadelphia and Interstate 95. While such projects
were essential for the growing logistics needs of the industrial
waterfront, they also served to further physically isolate the Navy
Yard from the activity of the rest of the city.
Despite its physical remoteness, the Navy Yard became a
significant part of the city's industrial identity. Situated between
the political power of Washington, DC and the financial might
of New York City, Philadelphia in the 19 th and early 2 0 th Century
was an industrial powerhouse. Known as "the Workshop of the
World' Philadelphia was a city where things were made. In
many ways, the Shipyard represented the pinnacle of the city's
production capacity, churning out 119 warships over its almost
two-hundred-year history. As the U.S. military expanded during
and after World War I, so too did the Shipyard, eventually
reaching its peak employment of 58,434 employees during the
Second World War (Dorwart 2001, 54). In a book published for
the 1 5 0 th anniversary of the naval base in 1951, Secretary of the
Navy Francis P. Matthews wrote, "I have every confidence that
one hundred and fifty years from today Americans will repeat
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this salute to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard when it celebrates
three hundred years of distinguished service to the fleet and to
the nation" (Bissinger 1997, 54).
In just a few decades, however, the Secretary's confidence in the
Navy Yard's resilience would prove to be wildly optimistic. The
latter half of the twentieth century saw a steady decline in both
the employment in and the production of the Philadelphia Navy
Yard. Particularly following the end of the Vietnam War, the
changing nature of U.S. military action and equipment needs led
to a reduction in the demand for the services of the Shipyard.
This mirrored a larger trend of deindustrialization in the United
States that was affecting cities like Philadelphia, that relied on
low-skilled manufacturing as it economic base, in profound
ways. As factories and plants across the city shut their doors and
laid off workers, politicians fought hard to keep the Navy Yard
open and in the face of a steady stream of rumors and threats of
closure from the Pentagon.
The end of the Cold War marked the death knell for the Navy Yard
as a public shipyard and many others like it across the country,
as the Navy, and indeed the entire U.S. military, underwent
a massive restructuring and downsizing. By 1991, when the
Department of Defense recommended that the Philadelphia
Naval Complex be closed, the Shipyard was a leader among
public shipyards in most measures of efficiency and timeliness.
More important to the Philadelphia economy, it was an anchor
for an ever-shrinking industrial base, attracting new firms and
maintaining the region's blue-collar workforce. At the time of its
closing, the Navy Yard directly provided employment for over
7,000 workers and was indirectly responsible for 36,000 jobs,
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$362.2 million in direct income, and $113 million in annual
state and local tax revenue, according a report commissioned by
Pennsylvania Economy League (Dorwart 2001, 218). The loss of
jobs and revenue for the region that would result from its closing
was potentially catastrophic.
BASE CLOSURE AND 1994 COMMUNITY REUSE
PLAN
"The entire process of shrinking the defense
establishment down to its right size was very,
very anxiety-prone and there was a lot of anger
involved."
- Joe Hare, Rhoads Industries
The closing of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard was but one small
part of a large-scale reduction and reorganization of military
bases across the country made in response to the end of the Cold
War and changing global security realities of the late 2 0 th century
(Frieden and Baxter 2000, v). While previous administrations had
attempted to reign in the Pentagon's budget through eliminating
unneeded facilities, those efforts were frequently thwarted by
Congressional Representatives more interested in saving jobs in
their districts than cutting redundancies in the Department of
Defense (New York Times 1985). The fall of the Soviet Union
provided the necessary impetus for a comprehensive, politically
palatable military base realignment plan. The Defense Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act, passed in 1990, outlined
the process by which the politically delicate decisions of which
bases to close or reuse would be made. Between 1988 and 1995,
a series of BRAC commissions released reports that resulted in
the closing of nearly one hundred major domestic military bases
24
and the realignment or reduction in size of many others (Hess et
al. 2001, 11).
The BRAC legislation provided an ostensibly objective and
transparent process by which to determine which bases would be
closed, as well as a standard set of procedures for the mothballing,
disposal, and mainstreaming of military facilities and equipment.
Additionally, the Department of Defense's Office of Ecohomic
Adjustment offered some funds for environmental remediation
and other efforts necessary to bring a military site in line with the
rest of the city. Despite these carefully considered procedures,
the base closure process was inherently complex and invariably
contentious. The closing of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard was
no exception.
The PNSY was selected for closure during the 1991 BRAC round
due to the duplication of shipyard functions at other bases on the
East Coast, especially the Naval bases in Norfolk and Newport
News which had more direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, and
the more general goal the Navy had to move 30% of its repair
work to private shipyards. The PNSY was also hampered by its
inability to perform nuclear overhauls on aircraft carriers, and
the fact that funds for the necessary retrofit were unavailable
(Hess et al. 2001, 12). The BRAC commission recognized that,
despite these shortcomings, the PNSY played an important role
for the Philadelphia region and that its closure would not be well
received:
"The impact on the city of Philadelphia would
be severe, particularly when added to proposed
closures of other Philadelphia-area bases. The
community believes that this is too large an impact
for any single region to bear. If Philadelphia
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Naval Shipyard is closed and mothballed, the
community stated that it would vigorously pursue
legislative relief to force reversion or outleasing
of shipyard property to the city." (Defense Base
Closure and Realignment Commission 1991, 49)
The community responded just as it had promised. Protests
against the closure focused on both economic and legal
justifications for its continued operation (Hess et al. 2001, 15).
The economic justifications were well known: the Navy Yard was
a significant employer of lower-skilled workers and was anchor
for the industrial sector in the city. Its closure would lead to a
potentially catastrophic loss of employment in a city that was
already struggling economically. Additionally, some argued
that the process by which the Philadelphia Naval Complex had
been selected for closure was illegal. In fact, then-Senator Arlen
Specter undertook a protracted legal case against the BRAC
commission that eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme
Court. While Specter's case was ultimately unsuccessful, it was
indicative of the passion with which both citizens and politicians
responded to the base closure news.
Even as Senator Spector's lawsuit was going forward then-
Mayor of Philadelphia Ed Rendell set up the Office of Defense
Conversion (ODC) within the City's Department of Commerce.
Rendell took a less combative approach to the news of the Navy
Yard's closing than did Specter. Rather than fight against the
decision in court, Rendell sought to make the inevitable closure
of the PNSY as painless for Philadelphia as possible. To that
end, Rendell and his administration focused on removing any
impediments to the shipyard's reuse and ensuring that the rest
of the site be redeveloped for new businesses as soon as possible.
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In its initial recommendation, the BRAC commission suggested
that the shipyard not just be decommissioned and turned over to
the City but be mothballed and put out of use entirely. Already
facing a city in which vacant industrial land was alarmingly
prevalent, Rendell fought hard against adding another 1200
acres to that, especially given the valuable (if slightly out-of-date)
shipbuilding equipment it included. Through his lobbying efforts,
the Navy eventually agreed to keep the shipyard operational and
allow its reuse by the City.
Mayor Rendell charged the Office of Defense Conversion with
the task of collecting and synthesizing the city's options for the
Navy Yard's repurposing and then producing a Community
Reuse Plan that would set forth recommendations for the site's
redevelopment. After months of work, the ODC released the
Community Reuse Plan in late 1994. Its recommendations were
based on two over-arching goals:
. Preserve the level of employment and economic
activity currently generated at the shipyard by preserving
the industrial capacity of the yard, by converting it to
civilian activities and by supporting the creation of new
jobs and economic activity
. Develop the excess land and facilities of the
yard to further the city's and region's goals of job
creation and revenue generation (Hess et al. 2001, 22)
From the very beginning, then, Philadelphia's primary objective
for the redevelopment of the Navy Yard was to maintain it as
site for employment and economic development. Concerns for
public open space, housing, historic preservation, or other forms
of reuse were considered secondarily or not at all (Philadelphia
Office of Defense Conversion 1994). The Community Reuse
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Figure 2.2: Development Plan for Le
(Philadelphia Office of Defense Convei
Figure 2.3: League Island as Indust
(Philadelphia Office of Defense Convei
Plan sought to leverage the unique environmental
and infrastructural facilities of the Navy Yard to
attract specific types of new businesses, including
traditional manufacturing firms, research and
development activities, start-up companies, and
commercial services. The development plan focused
on the central portion of the site, assuming that the
City would find a private-sector shipbuilding tenant
ague Island
sion 1994, 4) to take over its heavy industrial facilities of the
shipyard and that the eastern edge of the site would
be developed at a later date (ibid) (Figure 2.2). The
Plan made no effort to lift the deed restriction the
Navy had placed on residential development or
to push for public waterfront access or recreation
facilities. Rather the Navy Yard was intended to
remain a gated industrial park, cut off from the city
but providing employment opportunities for its
workers (Grady, John 2012) (Figure 2.3).
rial Park In 1995, the Office of Defense Conversion
sion 1994, 1 became a division of the Philadelphia Industrial
Development Corporation (PIDC), the City's
quasi-public, non-profit economic development agency (Hess
et al. 2001, 20). PIDC occupied a unique position within
Philadelphia, as it was a joint venture between the City and
the Chamber of Commerce. PIDC was identified as the City's
primary agent for the development of the Navy Yard. Given
the complexity of the process, PIDC's experience with land
management and infrastructure improvements as well as its
ability to offer direct financing made it the clear choice to manage
the conversion (Frieden and Baxter 2000, 27). PIDC's years of
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experience in land reuse and redevelopment distinguished it
from other cities' local redevelopment authorities, most of which
were formed at the time of a base closure and whose authority
was limited to the redevelopment of one site. However, PIDC's
responsibilities in the case of the Navy Yard were similar to other
local redevelopment authorities charged with base conversion.
PIDC functioned as both real estate developer and economic
development planner. It was the agency primarily responsible for
overseeing the normalization of base property and developing
business-attraction strategies (ibid, 43).
The goals of the Community Reuse Plan clearly point to the City's
emphasis on maintaining the Navy Yard as an industrial district,
ensuring continued employment for its blue-collar workforce. A
Master Lease signed in 1994 allowed the city to sublease space
to prospective tenants during closure process, and they did seek
out smaller firms to move into some existing facilities. The City's
primary focus, however, was finding a large firm to take over
the west end of the Navy Yard, where the major infrastructure
for shipbuilding was located. Between 1994 and 1997, the City
took aggressive action to attract a commercial shipbuilding firm
to the site. After an unsuccessful attempt to secure a deal with
the German shipbuilding firm Meyer-Werft, public officials
were able to finalize a deal with the Norwegian construction
conglomerate Kvaerner. The deal, signed in 1997, provided
nearly $400 million in public funding for the modernization
of the shipyard and job training for shipyard employees. Given
the large amounts of public funding provided, local and state
politicians made sure to emphasize that the investment would
go into permanent improvements to the site and local human
capital, as well as the fact that the yard would continue to be
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owned by the public (Gorenstein 1997). The money came from
the City of Philadelphia ($60 million), the Delaware River Port
Authority ($65 million), the federal government ($100 million),
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ($200 million). In
return, Kvaerner contributed approximately $135 million, and
agreed to a 99-year lease of the site and promised to provide a
certain level of employment for the first 15 years (Marder 1997).
From the beginning, the deal with Kvaerner was criticized for
laying only ambiguous and easily avoided obligations on Kvaerner
(Hess et al. 2001, 61). Indeed, there was great fear that the deal
would be broken completely when, only a few years after the deal
was finalized, Kvaerner came near to bankruptcy and had to be
sold to another Norwegian shipping conglomerate, Aker. To this
day, the shipyard continues to struggle in a changing economy,
with Pennsylvania extending Aker a $42 million loan in February
of 2011 in order to assure its continued local operations (Lloyd
2011). Among politicians and business leaders in Philadelphia,
there is still a strong effort to maintain skilled industrial jobs at
the Navy Yard.
While the Navy Yard was decommissioned in a grand ceremony
in 1995, the official transfer of ownership of the Navy Yard to the
city did not take place until 2000. The Navy ended up spending
over $300 million to close the Navy Yard. Almost a third of that
was spent on workforce-related costs, including pension payouts
and worker retraining programs. The rest was spent on selling
or otherwise disposing of plant equipment, mothballing unused
ships, shutting down facilities, mainstreaming the utility grid,
and undertaking environmental remediation of the site. While
the Navy has maintained a presence in the Navy Yard in the form
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of some research and development initiatives, its role as a major
regional employer is over.
THE 2004 MASTER PLANNING PROCESS AND
OUTCOMES
"I think when the city and ultimately when PIDC
got involved in [asking] 'what are we going to do
with the Navy Yard,' there was an immediate focus
on jobs. This place was always about jobs. It needs
to be about jobs."
- John Grady, PIDC
Between the announcement of the base's closure in 1991 and the
transfer of ownership in 2000, Philadelphia's primary focus on
the Navy Yard's physical redevelopment was on modernizing the
shipyard and securing a tenant for it. After the Kvaerner deal was
finalized and the Navy relinquished ownership, however, PIDC's
focus shifted to the development of the non-shipyard portion of
the site. As the owner of the site, PIDC responsibilities included
both master development (reconfiguring site for civilian use,
subdividing base into development parcels, preparing parcels
for development, marketing them, and installing or upgrading
core infrastructure) and component development (developing
sites for specialized uses such as housing or offices) (Frieden and
Baxter 2000, vii). In approaching these objectives, PIDC sought
to follow the guidelines and site plan established in the 1994
Community Reuse Plan.
In order to facilitate the development process, PIDC released a
Request for Proposals for a private-sector developer to partner
with them. Out of twelve submissions, PIDC chose Liberty
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Property Trust, a publicly traded real estate
investment trust headquartered in the Philadelphia
suburbs. Liberty is known for its development and
management of office and industrial space, much
of it located in suburban business parks. The deal,
Navy Yard which originally was only for the development of a
70-acre corporate office park at the entrance to the
Navy Yard, quickly expanded into a full partnership
between Liberty and PIDC for the development of the entire
non-shipyard portion of the site. The result was the Master Plan
for the Navy Yard, released in September 2004, which sought
to establish an overarching vision for the transformation of the
place (Figure 2.4).
In undertaking a master planning process for the Navy Yard,
PIDC was shouldering a new responsibility. The agency was
known for being opportunistic and transactional in its real estate
deals, very rarely engaging in long-term visioning or planning
efforts. John Grady, the President of PIDC, credits Liberty with
pushing the agency to rethink the Community Reuse Plan and
its rather staid approach to industrial development. By the early
2000s when the deal between Liberty and PIDC was established,
the economic conditions of the city were better than they were
when the CRP was written and the perception (both external
and internal) of Philadelphia was improving. Liberty believed
that they could push the boundaries of what was expected at
the Navy Yard, creating more of a neighborhood and less of an
isolated office park. They were the first to suggest the possibility
of including residential development in addition to commercial
and industrial space.
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The resulting document was a significant departure from
previous visions of the Navy Yard. The design of the 2004 Master
Plan for the Philadelphia Navy Yard was done by Robert A. M.
Stern Architects, which had worked with Liberty Property Trust
in the past and is perhaps best known in the urban planning field
for its work on the planned community of Celebration, Florida
developed by the Walt Disney Corporation. In its introductory
section, the Master Plan set out four guiding principles for the
Navy Yard's development:
1. The Navy Yard should develop, over time, as an urban,
mixed-use community, active 24-hours a day and 7 days a
week
2. Development at the Navy Yard should capitalize on and
enhance the Navy Yard's unique historical building and
landscape assets
3. Development at the Navy yard should set a high standard
for environmental sustainability
4. Development at the Navy Yard should aim to make
the site a regional asset and reopen as much waterfront
as possible to convenient public access (PIDC 2004, 4)
These principles present a contrast to the goals outlined in
the Community Reuse Plan of 1994 and much of the rhetoric
surrounding the Navy Yard's redevelopment since then. In
the Master Plan, the Navy Yard is envisioned as responding to
multiple needs and desires of the city: for a vibrant, mixed-use
community, for a public open space along the waterfront, and
for sustainable, environmentally friendly development. It was
also much more ambitious than the CRP, depicting significant
amounts of residential development and an expensive marina
project.
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At the time of this writing, PIDC has again partnered with
Liberty and Stern to produce an update to the Master Plan in
response to the changing dynamics of the Navy Yard and the
Philadelphia market. In the years since the Master Plan's release,
the Navy Yard has attracted a lot of attention - both from firms
looking to invest in the site and from media outlets looking to
highlight its transformation. Its success in both industrial and
commercial development has prompted PIDC to scale back many
of the more ambitious and tangential elements of the original
Plan and to refocus on developing office and laboratory space.
PIDC's success in attracting businesses to the Navy Yard has had
a particularly significant effect on the vision of the waterfront. In
the 2004 Plan, the Navy Yard's waterfront was intended primarily
for residential use, but is now being thought of as a place for
more commercial space. While PIDC still hopes to lift the Navy's
deed restriction on residential development, they are focusing
on loft conversions and rental units - a more palatable option for
both the Navy and the other industrial tenants of the Navy Yard.
Significantly, all discussion of including residential uses in the
site is justified by the improvements it will offer to commercial
and industrial users. Residential development will allow for
the small-scale amenities (banks, restaurants, cafes, and dry
cleaners), and that will improve the overall character of the site.
Even while embracing new uses, then, the Navy Yard is still first
and foremost a place of work.
COMPARATIVE NAVY YARD REDEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS IN BOSTON AND WASHINGTON, DC
"We looked a whole series of precedents [for the
design of the Navy Yard] and none of them is
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relevant in every way but we've looked at these
because they're relevant in different, individual
ways.
- Graham Wyatt, Stern Architects
The preceding sections outline a history of military base reuse
and waterfront redevelopment in Philadelphia over the past
two decades. This includes the vision for Philadelphia's Navy
Yard transitioning from a pure industrial park to a mixed-use
neighborhood to something in between: a waterfront that is
still primarily for work, but that incorporates elements of public
place and residential amenities. In order to place this evolution
in context, it is helpful to compare the story of the Philadelphia
Navy Yard to similar naval base closures in which the community
chose a different path for their waterfront. Both the Boston and
the Washington, DC Navy Yards began the conversion process
earlier than Philadelphia, but have seen similar reinvestment and
re-envisioning in the past two decades. Each is representative of
a purer form of waterfront purpose and design, and therefore is
a helpful comparison to the integrative approach being taken in
Philadelphia.
The Boston Marine Industrial Park is a 191-
acre industrial park that lies at the edge of the
rapidly developing Fort Point and South Boston
Waterfront neighborhoods (Figure 2.5). Purchased T
by the Department of Defense in the early 2 0 th
century to accommodate the expanding workload
of the Boston Navy Yard located in Charlestown,
the South Boston Naval Annex, as it was then
called, played a similar role in Boston's economy Figure 2.5:
as the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard did in its city. (Bost
S y cl #ntohational Frelght Torminal
Map of Boston Marine Industrial Park
:on Redevelopment Authority)
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Figure 2.6: Design Center at the Bost
Industrial Park
(By Tim Sackton from Somerville, M
SA-2.0, via Wikimedia Comm
It was a used for shipbuilding and repair as well as
the manufacture and distribution of a wide variety
of military goods. At its peak during World War
II provided employment for tens of thousands of
people. Post-war economic changes and military
restructuring led to the closure of Naval Annex in
1974. The Economic Development and Industrial
Corporation (EDIC), a quasi-public agency that has
o since become part of the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA), purchased the area in two
A [CC-BY- agreements with the Department of Defense in
1977 and 1983. Since then the BMIP has had the
stated goal of maintaining and promoting it as a
place of maritime and industrial employment for the city.
Most of the BMIP lies within a Designated Port Area, which,
under Massachusetts' law, requires that it preserve its maritime
industrial capacity. As the BMIP explains on its website:
"The BRA/EDIC is committed to carefully
regulating land use at BMIP by actively
promoting the development and utilization
of waterside parcels for water-dependent use
and the development and utilization of interior
parcels for compatible industrial use (i.e., non-
water dependent uses with direct benefits to the
water-dependent activity occurring in the park).
(Boston Marine Industrial Park 2012)
The result of these statutes is that this section of the Boston
waterfront has remained purely industrial in character and
use, even as the area around it transforms rapidly (Figure 2.6).
Recent infrastructure projects, most importantly the Big Dig
which resulted in the new Ted Williams Tunnel linking East
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Boston and Logan Airport with South Boston, have served
both to improve the commercial accessibility of the BMPI and
provide further infrastructural barriers to its public use. Those
same infrastructure projects, in conjunction with a recent push
from the Mayor and the BRA to redevelop the surrounding
neighborhoods of South Boston and Fort Point, have led to a
massive investment in new residential and commercial real
estate in the area. It will be interesting to see how the BMIP
adapts to these changing circumstances, and whether it responds
to pressure to become more open and accessible or further walls
itself off.
Unlike the Boston and Philadelphia naval bases, the Washington,
DC Navy Yard is still an operating federal facility. Located
in the southeastern section of the city along the Anacostia
River, the Washington Navy Yard was at one point the Navy's
largest shipbuilding center. Since World War II, the Navy has
consolidated its operations and gradually sold off portions of the
site for development by private businesses or transferred them to
other federal agencies. Consequently the area has transformed
from an industrial district where military weapons were designed
and built to a ceremonial and administrative space for the Navy's
bureaucracy. Similar to Philadelphia, infrastructure investments
in the mid-20th Century, particularly the construction of 1-395
and the corresponding displacement of much of the local
community, served to divide the waterfront from the rest of
the city. In the past decade, the surrounding neighborhood has
undergone significant city-led reinvestment, most noticeably the
construction of a new Major League Baseball stadium for the
Washington Nationals in 2008.
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Figure 2.8: Site Plan for the Y
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The Yards, a 42-acre residential and commercial
venture currently in development by Forest City
Washington and the Capital Riverfront Business
Improvement District, is indicative of the larger
pattern being promoted along the Anacostia River
waterfront (Figure 2.7). A mixed-use development,
the plan for the Yards emphasizes public open
space, waterfront access, and recreational activities
rfront at the along the river. The site, which was transferred
m/) from the Navy to the federal General Services
Administration in the 1960s and then from the
GSA to Forest City in 2008, sits between the
recently completed Nationals Baseball Stadium and
the Navy Yard. While construction of the planned
2,500 residential units and 1 million square feet
of office space is still underway, the development
team and the city recently unveiled the 5.8-acre
riverfront park that is the centerpiece of the project
(Figure 2.8). The park features a wide, open lawn
ards for passive recreation and will link to the Anacostia
Riverwalk, a planned 20-mile waterfront trail that
is currently in development. These features, along
with the intended retail, depict a waterfront meant for recreation
and consumption.
Undoubtedly there are limitations to the comparison of the
experiences in Boston and Washington with those ofPhiladelphia.
The Philadelphia site is considerably larger and suffers from
even greater physical isolation than either the Boston Marine
Industrial Park or the Washington Navy Yard. Each city has its
own history, economic landscape, and specific local institutions
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that make the waterfront planning and military base reuse
process unique. Yet the decisions made in each case regarding
what uses to promote in the redevelopment reflect the values of
the community and exemplify the varying formal elements those
values take in waterfront design. The Boston case provides a rare
example of pure industrial waterfront remaining in a rapidly
changing city landscape. The Washington plan is more typical of
recent waterfront developments in its blending of pastoral open
spaces and consumption-based retail and residential real estate.
These projects fall easily into the standard forms of waterfront
redevelopment outlined in introductory chapter. The following
chapters analyze the ways in which the design and redevelopment
of the Philadelphia Navy Yard both adheres to and obfuscates
these divisions of use and form.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE WATERFRONT AS
EMPLOYMENT CENTER
Waterfront development and the Philadelphia Navy Yard exist
within a context of wider urban economic development theory
and practice that has grown in response to the increase in
global economic competition. The previous chapter described
the decline of traditional military shipbuilding activity at the
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard that coincided with a nationwide
decline in manufacturing and heavy industrial production. The
resulting closing of the Shipyard led to the decision to transform
the site into a waterfront district that would remain a place of
employment for the Philadelphia region. PIDC embraced two
goals for the economic development of the new Navy Yard:
retaining traditional industry (such as shipbuilding and repair,
machine and metal fabrication, and manufacturing) and
attracting new service-oriented office tenants (including banking
and pharmaceutical industries, research and development
initiatives from educational institutions, and creative firms).
These strategies are very much in line with established patterns
and tools of economic development used by municipalities across
the United States. However, they have particular consequences
for the physical design and development of a large waterfront site
like the Navy Yard.
This chapter discusses the strategies PIDC and its partners
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Figure 3.1: Street Design within the
(Author's Photo)
have employed to accomplish their development goals for the
Philadelphia Navy Yard. Four different strategies for attracting
and retaining jobs to the Navy Yard are considered: the use of
tax incentives to lure new business to specific locations; the
use of cluster theory and industrial anchors to strengthen the
remaining manufacturing enterprises in the city; the provision
of amenities, such as restaurants and cafes, to attract the "creative
class;" and the possibility of including residential uses as a means
of encouraging the generation of those same amenities. The
final section discusses the implications of these strategies on the
design of the built form of the Navy Yard.
TAX-BASED INCENTIVES
As the previous chapter detailed, the effort to attract and
retain capital investment in the Navy Yard was from the very
beginning a publicly financed undertaking. In order to persuade
the Norwegian shipping conglomerate Kvaerner to bring
shipbuilding back to Philadelphia, local, regional, state and
federal government agencies all contributed public funds to
the shipyard's rehabilitation and the retraining of
employees. Since that time, PIDC has continued to
offer both direct and indirect financial incentives
to companies looking to relocate to the Navy Yard.
In keeping with its role as the site's redevelopment
authority, PIDC has made significant physical
improvements throughout the site, including
building and improving roads, upgrading electrical
and other utilities, and enhancing the landscape
Navy Yard through tree plantings and property maintenance
(Figure 3.1). These efforts, along with the grants
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for workforce retraining mentioned earlier, are in keeping with
traditional means of economic development by public agencies
(McGahey 2008, 5).
In recent decades, with increased competition for capital between
cities, jurisdictions have taken more aggressive approaches to
improve their competitive advantage in business attraction. The
most significant change has been the widespread use of the tax
system to lower the cost of investment. The Philadelphia Navy
Yard employs this approach generously. Offering tax credits,
tax abatements, and other fiscal incentives for locating in the
Navy Yard, PIDC has embraced a strategy that is not without
controversy. The following section outlines the debate over tax-
based economic development strategies in the United States
broadly, and describes how they are employed at the Navy Yard.
The idea that cities compete with one another for capital
investment - and the jobs and tax revenue that come with it - is
nearly universally accepted as fact, especially among policymakers
at the state and local levels. Even those who dispute the premise
of territorial competitiveness and argue that its broad acceptance
has resulted in ineffective and wasteful policies acknowledge
the fact that because so many municipalities have adopted
competitiveness policies, "significant strategic disadvantages
accrue to those localities that attempt to opt out of such policies,
or to adopt alternatives to them" (Brenner and Wachsmuth 2012,
2). Within this framework of constant competition, localities must
continually upgrade their place-specific assets in order to attract
businesses. These assets may come in the form of socioeconomic
resources, like quality infrastructure or an educated workforce
(the traditional tools employed by the public sector to encourage
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economic growth). However, in the last thirty years, more and
more jurisdictions at both the state and local levels have taken
a more neoliberal approach to economic development policy,
seeking to lower the cost of investment by offering tax relief to
companies that locate within their borders (ibid, 13). Yet the
question of whether such incentives induce significant new
investment or jobs has not been conclusively answered. In fact,
as one recent review of the literature concluded: "there are very
good reasons - theoretical, empirical, and practical - to believe
that economic development incentives have little or no impact
on firm location and investment decisions" (Peters and Fisher
2004, 32).
While the academic literature presents a gloomy picture, it has
had little noticeable effect on the use of incentives by states
and municipalities. Indeed, incentives are alive and well at the
Philadelphia Navy Yard. On its website, PIDC prominently
displays a wide variety of state and local incentives businesses
can take advantage of by locating in the Navy Yard (PIDC 2011).
These include:
* Tax credits (through Keystone Innovation Zone Tax
Credits for firms working within particular technology
sectors; Historic Tax Credits for the renovation of historic
buildings in the site, which is on the National Register
of Historic Places; and Research and Development Tax
Credits, again offered to firms in the technology industry,
especially small start-ups);
. Tax abatements (through the Keystone Opportunity
Improvement Zone, and Real Estate Tax Abatements
offered by the City); and
. Direct financing and loans at below-market interest
rates offered by PIDC.
These incentives are used by a wide range of the Navy Yard's
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tenants, from the metal fabrication firm Rhoads Industries to
the clothing retailer Urban Outfitters (Hare, Joe and Ziel, Dave
2012).
Of particular interest for the case of the Philadelphia Navy Yard
are tools known as either "enterprise zones" or "empowerment
zones." These tools are meant to direct investment to particularly
troubled or difficult areas of the city. As Peters and Fisher point
out, enterprise zones should be one of the best forms of economic
development, since they target generous incentives at small
places. Research, however, does not support this assumption.
Often the unfavorable factors that result in an area being
designated an enterprise zone are not mitigated by the incentives
offered (Peters and Fisher 2008, 31). The Navy Yard is designated
as a Keystone Opportunity Improvement Zone (KOIZ), a
classification given by the state of Pennsylvania that exempts
qualifying businesses from a wide range of city and state taxes,
including corporate income taxes, business privilege taxes, and
sales and use taxes, until 2018. The Keystone Opportunity Zone
program (of which the KOIZ is one particular classification)
was developed by the state in the late 1990s to encourage
investment in particularly troubled areas. PIDC operates many
of the KOIZs in Philadelphia, each of which must be approved
the City Council. According to Mark Seltzer, PIDC's Director
of Management and Development for the Navy Yard, there was
little controversy in awarding the designation to the Navy Yard,
given the City's strong interest in improving its attractiveness
to investors (Seltzer, Mark 2012). Since the Navy Yard's first
KOIZ designation in the early 2000's, there have been a series
of expansions and additions over the years. Today, nearly 1/3 of
the Navy Yard enjoys the KOIZ designation, though due to the
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particularities of the law, they are not contiguous parcels.
As with other KOIZ sites, the Navy Yard's tax benefits are offered
to any business that meets one of the following requirements:
it is locating from outside Pennsylvania; it is relocating from
within Pennsylvania and increases its employment by 20%
within one year; it makes a capital investment in property equal
to at least 10% of it's previous year's gross revenues; or it enters
into a lease with an aggregate payment equal to at least 5% of the
firm's previous year's gross revenues. PIDC estimates that these
various tax relief opportunities represent a savings of $10 to $20
per square foot annually (PIDC 2011). Brian Berson, Liberty
Property Trust's director of leasing for the Navy Yard, asserted
that there were "absolutely" firms that had come to the Navy
Yard specifically because of the tax savings offered. He estimated
that 10-15% of businesses with the Navy Yard take advantage of
these incentives, but that among Liberty tenants it was closer to
50-60%. This is due to the location of most Liberty properties
(almost all of which lie within the KOIZ designated area). Mr.
Berson further stated, "I think that there is a market for both
tax advantage seekers (who will predominantly come to [Liberty
Property Trust] buildings) and non-tax advantage seekers
(who may be distributed evenly between me and PIDC) at the
Yard" (Berson, Brian 2012). Mark Seltzer confirmed that those
taking advantage of the KOIZ benefits are in the far minority
of new tenants to the Navy Yard; those that do use it to offset
the premium in rents caused by the site's poor soil conditions
and high construction costs (Seltzer, Mark 2012). The KOIZ
has been a particularly effective tool for attracting tenants to
the Navy Yard, perhaps because firms can utilize both the tax
incentives it offers and the amenities of the non-KOIZ portions
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of the Navy Yard site. Furthermore, the disaggregated nature of
the KOIZ within the Navy Yard allows incentive-seeking firms to
be integrated among other businesses.
CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT AND ANCHOR INSTITUTIONS
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Navy Yard has long
been an anchor for the industrial and manufacturing sector in
Philadelphia. At its peak in the middle of the 20th century, PNSY
supported thousands of businesses in the shipbuilding sector
(Dowart 2001, 218). Part of the fear that drove the campaign
to keep the Yard open in the early 1990s was that the closure
would mean not just the loss of jobs at the Navy Yard itself, but
also the loss of jobs and businesses that depended on the Navy.
This understanding of the complex ways in which institutions,
governments, and private firms cooperate with one another to
spur economic growth in particular sectors was made famous
by Harvard Business School professor Michael Porter's work
on cluster theory. Porter defines a cluster as "a geographically
proximate group of interconnected companies and associated
institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and
complementarities" (Porter 2000, 16). While much of his work
focused on metropolitan or regional clusters, his theories have
been applied to smaller city-scale economic development policy.
The current resurgence of the Navy Yard as an employment center
can to a certain extent be attributed to the way it has nurtured
institutions, like the Navy itself. These organizations help to spur
related development in the private sector through the synergies
that result from physical proximity and cooperative partnerships.
While the Navy is no longer the economic lynch pin for the
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Philadelphia region that it was in the mid-twentieth-century, it
still plays an important role supporting the industrial sector in
the Navy Yard. After the PNSY was decommissioned, the Navy
chose to maintain a presence at the site. The Naval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) operates a major underwater propulsion
initiative that employs almost 2,000 highly trained engineers in
advanced research and development. Their research activity is an
almost $1 -billion-a-year endeavor that has profound implications
for the economic development of rest of the Navy Yard (Grady,
John 2012). The Navy's own operations are a significant source
of economic activity, and its continued growth is having serious
ramifications on the future growth and development of the
Navy Yard (which will be discussed in the next chapter). Yet it
is perhaps most important as an anchor tenant that attracts and
supports many traditional manufacturing firms and high-tech
R&D startups to the site.
The story of one business, Rhoads Industries, is indicative of
how the Navy's continued presence at the Navy Yard has been
instrumental in maintaining the industrial base of the site. Rhoads
Industries is a family-owned mechanical construction and metal
fabrication firm that was founded in Philadelphia in 1938. At the
time of Navy Yard's closing in the early 1990s, the firm was based
in North Philadelphia and was doing about $5 million in annual
business. One of the firm's vice presidents, Bruce Nefferdorf,
was a retired Naval Warrant Officer and saw the potential for
Rhoads to expand into government contracting. The military
restructuring that led to the closure of the PNSY and many
other bases also resulted in a significant increase in the amount
of work the military contracted out to private firms. NAVSEA,
the Navy's engineering department, maintained a facility at
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the Navy Yard after it was decommissioned. Its
primary responsibility was developing the next
propulsion system (an electric motor) to allow
the heat signature of military vessels to match
merchant ships. As Joe Hare, Director of Shipyards
Operations for Rhoads Industries and a retired
Naval officer himself, put it, "at the time of PNSY's
closing, NAVSEA was a $40 or $50m enterprise
that acted as an anchor that kept the lights on even
Figure 3.2in the immediate aftermath of the closure of the Bu
base" (Hare, Joe 2012).
Nefferdorf recognized that Rhoads could reuse some of the
facilities that Navy left, and that the proximity would put the firm
in a good position to do business with the Navy. In 2001, Rhoads
leased Building 16, a large industrial facility in the shipyard
portion of the Navy Yard (Figure 3.2) and started to work along
side Northrup Grumman, a major contractor with the Navy.
After Northrup turned down PIDC's offer to buy Building 16,
Rhoads bought the building and ended up subleasing it back
to Northrup Grumman. This partnership led to Rhoads doing
business with directly with NAVSEA and choosing to expand
their facilities in the Navy Yard. Eventually they consolidated
their operations there in the mid-2000s. As Joe Hare explained,
"we ve created this combined business that generally doesn't exist
in the shipyard industry. We've been provided with a transition
that has allowed us to put together a multi-faceted business that
can do both shipyard work and metal fabrication." Perhaps most
importantly, from the City and PIDC's perspective, they have
been able to grow their company, which employs blue-collar,
union workers, from $5 million a year to nearly ten times that
Nuclear Brine Pressure Chambers in
ilding 16 (Rhoads Industries)
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(Hare, Joe 2012). The unique needs of the Navy and its physical
presence at the Navy Yard ensure a continued anchor for
industrial employment there. PIDC is pursuing a similar strategy
to grow the energy research and development sector through the
Greater Philadelphia Innovation Cluster (GPIC), a partnership
with Penn State University that is focused on improving energy
efficiency (Grady, John 2012).
While the Rhoads Industries case may be considered a success,
more public efforts to encourage industrial job growth in the Navy
Yard have struggled. The recent difficulties that the Navy Yard's
two largest and best-known industrial tenants, Aker Shipyard
and Tasty Baking, have faced illustrate the still tenuous position
of industrial jobs in the Philadelphia region. Aker continues to
struggle to remain competitive in the commercial shipbuilding
field; Tasty Baking, a Philadelphia institution, found themselves
near bankruptcy after moving their operations to the Navy Yard
and constructing a LEED-certified, $78 million new factory
there. Even with the support, both rhetorical and financial,
offered by the public sector, not to mention the gleaming new
facilities they occupy in the Navy Yard, it seems it seems that
successful industrial job creation in the Navy Yard is predicated
on the presence of an institutional anchor that is outside the
private sector. Whether it is the Navy providing valuable military
contracts or GPIC offering inexpensive laboratory space, the
retention and growth of the industrial and R&D sectors in the
Navy Yard relies on quasi-public institutions supplying the
necessary support.
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CREATIVE CLAss ATTRACTION
While the image of the Navy Yard as an industrial district
remains, the most prominent and successful examples of
business attraction there in the past few years have been
fairly standard office tenants that have either renovated and
reused existing buildings in the site or constructed their own.
In a deal announced in the summer of 2011 for example, the
pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline agreed to move its 1,300
Philadelphia-based employees from Center City to newly-
constructed office building in the Navy Yard. The move, which
GSK said would save approximately $26 million in real estate
costs, was facilitated with a ten-year tax abatement standard for
all new construction in the city (Hill 2011). The project did not
qualify for many of the other tax credits because it would not
be adding jobs to the economy. GSK's move from its downtown
location is significant in that contradicts some of Richard Florida's
theory on the attractiveness of downtowns for office workers
(Florida 2003, 7). As Philadelphia Inquirer architecture critic
Inga Saffron noted, "Glaxo's philosophy goes against everything
planners have been telling us about the competitive advantages
of America's downtowns. Supposedly, they stood to benefit
from their high density, good transit links, mouthwatering
restaurants and coolness quotient - traits considered essential for
attracting talent" (Saffron 2011). The idea that cities should focus
on attracting people (rather than firms) by providing certain
amenities and an attractive environment is central to Richard
Florida's theories on the "creative economy." While Saffron's
comment suggests that the Navy Yard does not provide these
sought after amenities, in fact PIDC has focused much of its
marketing efforts on promoting the image of the Navy Yard as an
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alternative downtown, with the same vibrancy and advantages
of a healthy city neighborhood. These efforts are part of PIDC's
attempt to diversify the type and number of firms that want to
invest in the Navy Yard, making it a place that is attractive not
only to traditional industrial firms interested in its shipbuilding
and manufacturing facilities, but also to firms looking for more
standard office space in a "cool" location (Grady, John 2012).
The tenant that has done the most to shape the image of the
Navy Yard as one that is both industrial and creative is URBN,
the parent company of clothing retailers Urban Outfitters,
Anthropologie, and Free People. URBN had been based in
Center City Philadelphia since its establishment by a University
of Pennsylvania graduate in the 1970s. The company has grown
rapidly over the past few decades; by the early 2000s, it occupied
a number of different buildings in Center City, with each of its
divisions housed separately. The company sought to consolidate
its operations, but was having trouble finding office space in
Center City that fit their unique culture. (Dave Ziel, the Chief
Development Officer of URBN, pointed out that none of the
Center City buildings would allow tenants to bring their dogs to
work, a point of importance for the young employees of URBN.)
At the time they were shown the Navy Yard by their broker, it
was still a relatively derelict site, especially outside the shipyard.
Yet the numerous abandoned warehouses in the Historic Core
presented URBN with the flexible real estate it was looking for to
create a unified corporate campus, as well as the tax incentives
necessary to realize it. URBN eventually ended up investing
over $150 million into their Navy Yard headquarters and are
currently negotiating for the development of five more buildings
representing a $50 million investment. Their historically sensitive
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renovation of the warehouses won numerous
accolades from the architecture community and
landed PIDC and the Navy Yard a wealth of free
publicity (Ziel, Dave 2012) (Figure 3.3). While the
various financial incentives PIDC offered URBN
to become the Navy Yard's pioneer non-industrial
tenant were certainly part of the equation, the
biggest reason for the move, as Ziel explained, was
"that we could create a cohesive culture that fits
Figure 3.3 Ad
with who we are and it puts us in an environment Urb
that inspires our creativity and ultimately helps
our retention of creative people." URBN's efforts
to create such an environment (including their
operation of a public cafeteria or their renovation
of one of the dry docks into a waterfront park) have
resulted in the kind of urban amenities that Florida
argues are necessary for talent attraction (Figure
3.4). While URBN's contributions are relatively
small relative to the whole of the Navy Yard, they
are reflective of PIDC's wider strategy for attracting Figure 3.4 Th
new capital investment.
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
One key element of PIDC's plan for encouraging the growth of
amenities that attract new firms is their pursuit of residential
development within the Navy Yard. The site has a rich history
of residential use. During its heyday as a military base, the site
contained a variety of residential forms for the military officers
and enlisted men who worked there. The charming officers'
quarters that line the central streets have since been converted
aptive Reuse of Historic Buildings at the
an Outfitters Campus (PIDC)
e Park at Dry Dock 1, Part of the URBN
Campus (Author's Photo)
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to offices, and the workers housing on the far eastern edge have
been abandoned for decades (Grady, John 2012). Yet when the
base closed and ownership passed to the City, the Navy placed
a deed restriction against residential use in any redevelopment
efforts out of security concerns given the continuing operation of
some Naval activities there. In the nearly two decades since that
decision was reached, however, the Navy Yard has undergone
significant transformation. While residential use was not
mentioned as a possibility in the original Community Reuse
Plan completed in 1994, it was an important element of the 2004
Master Plan. John Grady has been pursuing the lifting of the deed
restriction in earnest for the past few years, and is optimistic that
it can be lifted in the next year or so.
The original vision of residential use in the Navy Yard laid out
in the 2004 Master Plan included a large marina district filled
with a mix of townhouses and condominiums. However, the
success PIDC and Liberty Property Trust have had in industrial
and commercial business development and attraction has altered
the scope and style of residential use. The current thinking is to
use relatively small amounts of mainly rental units to spur the
development of amenities that will make the site more attractive
to the corporations. These amenities - coffee shops, restaurants,
and dry cleaners, for example - result from a mix of people
using the site beyond the traditional 9-5 work day, but are also
demanded based on shifting demographics that Florida identified
and John Grady recognizes. As Grady pointed out, "since the
early 1990s until now there has been a demographic shift where
cities are becoming places of choice for young workers and that
is forcing companies to look at cities differently." While PIDC
and Liberty try to court investment from a variety of different
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types of firms, they are finding that it is not just a question of
financial incentives and adequate infrastructure. Rather, there
is also a demand for urban amenities that require a particular
blend of uses and have specific consequences for the form of
development.
LAND USE AND DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
The Navy Yard's economic development strategies have
brought over 100 companies to the site since its conversion,
and employment now stands at about 8,000 workers - slightly
more than were employed there just prior to the closure (PIDC
2011). While offering tax incentives, supporting institutional
anchors, and attracting creative capital are all standard economic
development tools, they have specific design consequences in a
waterfront business district like the Navy Yard. In considering
the design implications of the developments described in the
preceding sections, it is worth discussing the evolution of the
standard suburban office park that the Navy Yard both emulates
and transcends.
The movement of employment spaces - both industrial and
standard office space - from the city to the suburbs followed the
growth of large suburban housing developments that sprung up
in the 1940s and 1950s. Moving industry from the "dirty" city to
the pastoral open spaces of the suburbs was seen as having both
sanitary and moral benefits for the environment and workers
(Lane 1998, 152). The phenomenon was facilitated by suburban
tax structures, new zoning forms, and regional transportation
systems (Mozingo 2001, 157). In their layout and design, they
differed from earlier urban industrial districts in significant ways:
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"[Suburban office parks differed from urban
industrial districts] in their reduced site coverage,
complete reliance on the horizontal factory, and
emphasis on appearance and landscaping. They
offered large tracts of inexpensive, developable
land with flexibility for expansion and convenient
access. Private developers provided infrastructure
for parcels large enough for horizontal factories,
parking, loading, and ample landscaping" (Lane
1998, 152).
Suburban business districts were initially developed by private
interests, either a single corporation looking to develop its own
campus or in later years a real estate developer who would sell
or lease space to smaller businesses. By the 1980s the scale of
office parks increased dramatically, and had shifted from being
purely private efforts to having public financial and jurisdictional
apparatus supporting them (Mozingo 2011, 186). The Navy Yard
clearly bears a resemblance to these suburban business parks
in both form (careful landscaping, ample parking, and low
density development) and operation (publicly-supported private
development).
The suburban business park has become a ubiquitous part of
the economic and physical landscape of the urban fringe, and
yet its popularity is waning. Cities attempting to grow their
economies through physical spaces devoted to employment are
rethinking the form those spaces take. John Grady stated, "The
suburban office park, as a model, is dying" and argued that in
approaching the Navy Yard, PIDC and Liberty Property Trust
had to try something else. As he said, "if we were to distinguish
ourselves, we couldn't just build a suburban office park in the
city." The strategy for accomplishing this was to move away from
a single purpose space. In redeveloping the Navy Yard, PIDC's
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economic policies sought not only to mix the types of businesses
- industrial, commercial, R&D - but also to diversify the uses
more broadly by bringing in residential and providing a public
waterfront park. The rethinking of the residential component
for the update to the Master Plan is especially indicative of the
ways the economic goals of the Navy Yard come into conflict
with some of initial design ideals. By doing away with the Marina
District and encouraging rental units in converted warehouses,
PIDC is showing that the primary purpose of the Navy Yard
remains employment. The new form of residential planned for
the Navy Yard is more palatable both to the commercial and
industrial tenants of the site, who would prefer tenants who are
not as concerned about noise and the other results of industrial
work. Converting abandoned lofts into rental units will also be
more attractive to the type of residents PIDC thinks would be
interested in the Navy Yard as a place to live - mostly young,
educated, fairly transient people who would be intrigued by the
mix of uses and might work for the Penn State research facility,
one of the technology start-ups, or for URBN. Brian Berson, who
acknowledged that they had an easier time with development in
Navy Yard than in other sites because of the lack of neighbors,
nevertheless stated, "we are anxiously awaiting that [lifting the
deed restriction on residential] to happen. The reality is, having
neighbors might complicate our work. But it's worth it." The
worth of the residential is seen entirely in the benefits it will give
to the corporate tenants already in the Navy Yard and expected
to come in the future. Thus, the decision to move away from a
distinct residential district in the way it was portrayed in the
initial Master Plan is due to its potential interference with the
objectives of the site: the commercial and industrial economic
growth of the Navy Yard.
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PIDC's economic development strategies also
have implications for the planned and existing
architecture of the Navy Yard. There are four
dominant structural forms within the site, each
inhabiting its own particular zone: specific
industrial machinery and infrastructure in the
Shipyard (Figure 3.5); 191 and early 20th century
building stock in the Historic Core (Figure 3.6);
new construction of "high-design" office buildings
in the Corporate Center (Figure 3.7); and planned
light industrial/laboratory space for incoming R&D
firms (Figures 3.8). These distinct architectural
forms correspond to the different industrial and
commercial users that the economic development
strategies have worked to attract. A company like
URBN renovates a series of 19th-century warehouses
to their needs, and both enhances its image as a
creative firm and encourages other businesses to
see the Navy Yard as a unique, innovative location.
Tax incentives lure corporations away from Center
City, and they construct gleaming glass-and-steel
office buildings. The Navy expands its propulsion
research activities and demand for laboratory
space near their facility grows. In an effort to grow
the Navy Yard as an employment center, PIDC
and its partners have applied a broad brush to its
economic development strategies; this diversity
in the policy approach has led to a diversity of
architectural forms as well.
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Figures 3.5-8 Architecture from the Industrial,
Historic, Corporate, and R&D districts
(Rhoads Industries, Author's Photo, Author's Photo,
Liberty Property Trust)
While the Navy Yard may be said to be a diverse
employment center - certainly more so than
the suburban office parks it is seeking to replace
- it does not follow that these diverse uses are
integrated. The marketing of the Navy Yard gives
the impression of it as a diverse neighborhood
with a range of types of businesses and other
uses. To some extent that image is true; both the
industrial and non-industrial commercial tenants
are growing, a new hotel is under construction,
and there is the promise of residential units and
the corresponding small-scale amenities. Yet
the site plan of the Navy Yard reveals that these
different uses are still kept fairly separate. Each use has its own
section of the Navy Yard, which is spatially and formally distinct
(Figure 3.9). Dave Ziel of URBN says he sees the Historic Core
and URBN's headquarters as the "real" Navy Yard, whereas the
Corporate Center is a separate entity (Ziel, Dave 2012). The site
plan thus reveals that in attempting to integrate these disparate
uses in one space, PIDC and its partners have not moved as
far away from the suburban office park as they would like. The
Navy Yard still functions as a suburban-style office park within
the city limits, offering open space and flexible workspace with
the cache of a waterfront location that is attractive not only to
water-dependent manufacturing firms but also to more standard
office-based companies. The next chapter concerns the open
space of the Navy Yard and the tension between its use as a public
waterfront amenity and a privately controlled value-generator for
the corporate interests of the commercial tenants that support it.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE WATERFRONT AS
PUBLIC SPACE
Urban waterfront redevelopment efforts of the past half-century,
regardless of their scale or purpose, almost universally place an
emphasis on public access and public place-making at the water's
edge. Yet the idea that the waterfront is a public amenity that
should be accessible to the general population is a relatively
recent one, historically speaking. As long as the waterfront was
primarily a functional element of the city - necessary for trade,
industrial production and transportation - it existed somewhat
independently of the non-working lives of the city's residents.
With changes in the American economic structure over the
last half-century, the urban waterfront's industrial purpose has
waned while its role in the public life of the city has grown. In
the present political climate, any waterfront redevelopment
project must have a public access element to it. This is certainly
true of the redevelopment of the Philadelphia Navy Yard. While
the economic goals described in the previous chapter were and
remain the primary rationale for the redevelopment, improving
the public space and ensuring access to the waterfront are a
significant justification for the project's public investment. One
of the eight planning objectives of the 2004 Master Plan was to
"craft an integrated system of public open spaces and pedestrian
routes, and facilitate public access to the waterfront" (PIDC 2004,
24). This chapter focuses on the public spaces in the Navy Yard
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and how they contribute to the Plan's stated objectives.
The Master Plan divides the public spaces of the Navy Yard into
two general categories: passive and active (PIDC 2004, 28). These
categories align well with two standard models of public open
space in waterfront redevelopment projects: the pastoral, passive
public waterfront and the festive, recreational public waterfront.
Just as the last chapter discussed how PIDC and its partners have
employed standard economic development theories at the Navy
Yard with particular land use and design implications, this chapter
will use these standard models of public open space to explore
the ways in which the Navy Yard adheres to and departs from
typical waterfront forms. The two models both operate within
the context of the accepted waterfront redevelopment paradigm,
which emphasizes complete public access. The final section of
the chapter explores the ways in which the public accessibility
of the Navy Yard comes into conflict with the primary goal of
the re-imagined site, which is economic development and job
creation, through two central design issues: security and parking.
The redevelopment plan of the Navy Yard employs a "campus"'
concept of public space in which open space is integrated with
ongoing enterprises and implicitly supports the populations of
those enterprises. As the following analysis reveals, there are few
public spaces meant to attract outside populations, thus setting it
apart from the typical waterfront park model.
THE PASTORAL, PASSIVE PUBLIC WATERFRONT
The pastoral ideal has existed in American landscape design
for over two centuries. Stemming for the aesthetic theories of
18* century Britain, the pastoral is often associated with an
62
idealization of nature. Pastoral spaces eschew artificial geometry
and axes, and are characterized by open fields, unobstructed
natural vistas, and uncontrived landscaping (Mozingo 2011,
9). The previous chapter described how this ideal was used in
corporate campuses and business parks developed in the mid-
twentieth century, but it originally came to prominence in
landscape design at the beginning of the century as the primary
characteristic of the public park. It was especially associated with
Fredrick Law Olmstead and his design for Central Park in New
York City. Central Park became a model for many other urban
parks, including Fairmont Park in Philadelphia. Olmstead said
he wanted to "evoke a familiar, tranquil, and cultivated nature as
a counterpoint to the city" (Mozingo 2011, 9). The pastoral ideal
was not merely a means for promoting physical beauty, but was
also embraced for its supposed beneficial effects on the moral
order and spiritual lives of urban dwellers. It was explicitly a
counter to the industrialized landscape (ibid). As many formerly
industrial waterfronts were redeveloped in the later half of the
twentieth-century, the pastoral landscape remained a driving
design ideal. In fact, the body of water (lake, river, or bay) was
often encompassed in the pastoral landscape. While
the industrial users saw the water from a utilitarian
perspective, the redevelopment of the waterfront
as a public amenity shifted the association of the
water from utilitarian to aesthetic.
The idea of the river as a public amenity and part
of a beautiful, serene landscape is very much at
play in the design of the Navy Yard's waterfront
trail (Figure 4.1). As John Grady pointed out, "the
Figure 4.1 The Riverfront Trail currently
river is a tremendous resource, and the central (Author's Photo)
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principle is to open up access to it" One of the first landscaping
actions was the removal of a ten-foot hedge that the Navy had
placed along the waterfront, allowing visual and physical access
to the water's edge (Grady, John 2012). Other elements of the
plan also emphasized the waterfront as a central organizing
element: streets were extended to the water to allow more and
better pedestrian approaches to the water, and the other open
spaces in the site were arranged to provide orientation towards
the river (ibid). The waterfront is also seen as a primary driver of
development; as Brian Berson argued, "the water is a huge part
of the appeal of the campus. There is something visceral about
[it's attractiveness]." Yet there is an inherent tension between the
vision of the waterfront as part of a serene landscape, and the
reality of its use. The waterfront trail does not extend into the
shipyard (West of Broad Street), where the water is part of the
working landscape, and the view across the river is of oil refineries
in New Jersey. Despite their incongruity, the image of the large
industrial machinery surrounded by peaceful waterfront park
is not without precedent. Indeed the effort to "pastoralize" the
industrial landscape by placing it within a natural landscape is
closely tied to the dual vision of American life - both powerful
and peaceful (Lane 1998, 153). The tension here arises from the
public purpose of the waterfront trail abutting the closed-off
shipyard. The standard pastoral waterfront model is thus limited
by the non- standard mixed nature of the Navy Yard setting.
Like the waterfront trail (which is still under construction), the
other major public spaces in the Navy Yard are also characterized
by their pastoral, open qualities. The development plan for the
Navy Yard organizes the major uses into separate districts, each
with its own "green space" to anchor the development. The
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open space is the bone structure around which
development is organized; in fact, John Grady
used Olmstead's Emerald Necklace in Boston as an
analogous form. The first major landscaping effort
was the Corporate Center green (Figure 4.2), which
is placed at the entrance of the Navy Yard. The
goal was to put a major open space element at the
entrance, both to frame the new development and
to send a clear signal that one was entering a new
Figure 4.2 C
neighborhood (Grady, John 2012). The openness
and greenness of the park presents a strong
contrast to the large naval vessels and shipbuilding
equipment immediately to the west of the entrance; the green
lawn is meant to signal that the Navy Yard is a more welcoming
place than it was previously (ibid). The quality of the existing
environment (including the historic buildings, and especially the
maturity of the landscape) helps to bolster the image of a serene,
idyllic green space within which commercial development is
situated.
The transformation of the river from a functional and
infrastructural element of the working waterfront to a mostly
visual element of the pastoral waterfront has not diminished its
potency to spur development. Today, the river not only gives
value to water-dependent industrial uses, but also to standard
businesses, which benefit from the value generated by the scenery
it provides (Ziel, Dave 2012). Liberty Property Trust and PIDC
take seriously the potential of the waterfront and the open green
spaces to add value to commercial development in the Navy
Yard. To that end, they are hiring some of the most prominent
landscape architecture firms, like James Corner Field Operations
rescent Park in the Corporate Center
(Author's Photo)
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and Michel Van Valkenburgh, to design the spaces. As Brian
Berson stated, PIDC and Liberty Property Trust "are taking the
same approach to open space as we do to the buildings, which is:
let's find the most extraordinary talent within reach."
THE FESTIVE, RECREATIONAL PUBLIC WATERFRONT
While the pastoral waterfront park is common, the most
popular form of waterfront development, both as discussed in
the planning literature and celebrated in the popular media, is
the festive, recreational waterfront. Epitomized by projects like
Baltimore's Inner Harbor or Hudson River Park in Manhattan,
this form of waterfront is characterized by its many recreational
amenities, both water dependent and not, which draw residents
and tourists to the waterfront. These projects often support a
wide range of ancillary development, including luxury residential
units and high-end office space (Breen and Rigby 1996, 25). As
Malone describes below, the festive waterfront differs from the
more purely commercially driven project in both its imageability
and its political value:
"The emphasis on public open space and facilities
is another keyfactor that maybe used to distinguish
between developments... the ambitions behind
such projects differ from those behind projects
driven primarily by economic ambitions or
the commercial objectives of the development
industry. They may also have a different meaning
in terms of the city. Economically, they may be
sustained by urban tourism rather than the
financial or other sectors of the economy; but
they can contribute indirectly to the economic
status of the city as a 'cultural capital' or resources
for urban marketing. They may be imbued with
66
greater social and cultural significance and,
as 'public projects', may accommodate a
variety of political ambitions. In this respect,
the politics of public facilities, exhibitions,
and festivals have added an important
dimension to waterfront development.
The provision of amenities may be fused
with the appeasement or seduction of an
electorate" (Malone 1996, 4)
Indeed the image of the festive, recreational
waterfront is so popular it has its own political Figure 4.2
power. While PIDC did not have a particularly
difficult time getting the Master Plan for the Navy
Yard approved, it is nonetheless telling that the primary image
they used to sell the Plan to the public was not of the extensive
commercial development planned for the site, but of the Marina
District, the most public and recreational element of the proposed
development (Grady, John 2012) (Figure 4.3).
The majority of the open, public space in the Navy Yard is un-
programmed most of the time. What programming there is
consists mainly of one-off events (charity events, outdoor movies
in the summer, concerts by the Philadelphia Orchestra, and the
culmination of the annual Broad Street Run) that allow the Navy
Yard to open itself to the wider public in specific and controlled
ways (Grady, John 2012). While these types of events are not
uncommon at more traditional festive waterfronts (Penn's
Landing also features orchestra concerts and charity events,
for example), the design of the site reflects the Navy Yard's
ambivalence towards its role as a public destination. Public
space is disaggregated, with individual green spaces anchoring
particular development areas; there is no central gathering place
Illustration of the Proposed Marina
(PIDC 2004, 50)
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for large events. Since the release of the 2004 Master Plan, PIDC
and its partners have further distanced the Navy Yard from the
festive public waterfront model by significantly decreasing the
amount of waterfront dedicated to that purpose in the Master
Plan update (Wyatt, Graham 2012).
A number of factors have combined to decrease the space given
to the festive, recreational public spaces in the Navy Yard. One
factor, which can be attributed to the success of the Navy Yard's
economic development policies, is the growth of industrial
sector (especially the Port of Philadelphia and the Navy), which
has constricted the available riverfront space in the Navy Yard.
The other is the relatively recent development of recreational
waterfronts at Schuylkill and Central Delaware Rivers, which are
both located closer to the population center of the city. Both the
availability and the demand for festive waterfront amenities have
therefore decreased since the release of the 2004 Master Plan.
The best, and arguably only, example of festive waterfront design
at the Navy Yard was the original plan for a Marina District
included in the 2004 Master Plan. Unlike the other districts of
the Master Plan, the Marina District featured a number of uses
that would draw people who were not necessarily employees of
one of the Navy Yard's tenant businesses to the waterfront; these
uses included "an executive conference center, a combination of
surface and structured parking, retail space along the Diagonal
Boulevard and Riverfront Esplanade, a recreation facility in
the former Seaplane Hangar, and a 250-slip marina including
on-shore facilities" (PIDC 2004, 46). It also proposed nearly
1,400 residential units in a combination of three to four story
townhouses and two-family duplexes. While fundamentally
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different in purpose than the industrial and commercial uses
found throughout the rest of the site, the extensive amount of
waterfront available - nearly 2 /2 miles - allowed PIDC and its
partners to plan for a more public and recreational use in one
segment of the site.
However, since the Plan's release, both the Navy and the Port
Authority have expanded into areas previously meant for the
Marina District. The Navy is developing new facilities for its
propulsion research laboratory in the western portion of the area
and the Port Authority purchased land from the eastern portion
for the expansion of its logistics hub. The amount of waterfront
available for development - either for a public amenity like
the marina or for further commercial development - has thus
been significantly constrained. The result is that many of the
recreational features and nearly all of the residential development
for this portion of the Navy Yard have been abandoned in the
update for the Master Plan that Stern & Associates is currently
working on. The festive, public waterfront park space, which was
a central element of the Plan's initial release, is thus
a casualty of the success of the Navy Yard's success
as an industrial and commercial business park.
Two design decisions were made in response
to these changing circumstances, both with
commercial development in mind: the addition
of a constructed water feature (a canal) and the
shortening of the central diagonal boulevard
(Figure 4.4). The canal serves a number of purposes:
it functions as a stormwater retention center that
Figure 4.4 Massing Plan for Former Marina District
will treat runoff from the surrounding parking lots (Author's Photo)
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naturally, releasing the treated water back into the river. It also
provides a focus for development away from the riverfront and
towards the center of the site. Likewise the diagonal boulevard,
which was a prominent feature of the original Master Plan
design, has been shorted, terminating at an iconic building (to
be constructed). Like the canal, it concentrates the focus of real
estate development at the center of the Navy Yard, rather than
along the waterfront. The principle public space in the Navy Yard
is now no longer at the waterfront but rather more or less at the
geographic center of the development area. Both of these design
decisions were made with commercial development in mind;
without the Marina functioning as a recreational anchor, the
purpose of the waterfront has shifted from an amenity for the
whole city to a development-driver for commercial interests. It
also belies the Navy Yard as a completely waterfront-dependent
development. By focusing both public space and commercial
development away from the river, the new vision of the Navy
Yard relies very little on the water itself for either its purpose or
its image.
While some tenants, like Dave Ziel at URBN, regret the loss of
the original scheme for the Marina District, others, like Brian
Berson welcome the change. As he stated, "the marina district
was this romantic, but not well-thought-out residential district
in the master plan. It was the wrong density, the wrong planning
principles, the wrong everything." Both Mr. Berson and Mr. Wyatt
argue that the goal of the Navy Yard should not be to replicate the
high-end residential and commercial enclaves of the Boston and
Washington, DC Navy Yard redevelopments; rather the update
to the Master Plan should focus on commercial and industrial
development, and use residential sparingly as an amenity-driver.
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As Mr. Berson put it, they want to make the Navy Yard more like
Northern Liberties, a rapidly gentrifying neighborhood north
of Center City, which is home to a mix of businesses, boutique
stores, and condominiums in converted lofts and rowhouses. For
this kind of development, a major recreational public park with
surrounding luxury residential units is not needed.
LAND USE AND DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
The preceding sections have described how the public open
space at the Navy Yard, both as it was envisioned in the Master
Plan and how it has been implemented and adapted, conforms to
and departs from two standard waterfront public space models.
While the original vision for the site portrayed a balance of
pastoral open spaces and programmed recreational amenities,
there has been a distinct shift away from spaces that do not serve
primarily as a means to add value to (mainly commercial) real
estate development. The Navy Yard has become less a public
waterfront and more a private office park. Two design and land
use elements - security and parking - illustrate the continuing
tension between the idea of the Navy Yard as a public waterfront
park and the reality of it as a place for private commercial
development. Because of its original nature as a secure site, it
is perhaps not surprising that the Navy Yard has retained the
character of a "gated community"
The question of the site's security and exclusivity is one in
which the similarities between the Navy Yard and the standard
suburban business park are particularly striking. In his essay on
the development of industrial parks in the mid-twentieth century,
Robert Lane remarks on how part of their value to businesses lay
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in their ability to deny access to other uses:
"Within the park, it was possible... to exclude any
activity deemed incompatible with industry...
Low site coverage and generous setbacks reduced
potential conflicts with neighbors beyond the
boundaries of the park. Typically, industrial
districts had at most two or three points of access
and these were clearly articulated as gateways
and often guarded. The creation of any kind of
through road was studiously avoided." (Lane
1998, 152-153)
The question of who has access to the site is particularly important
when discussing the provision and purpose of the Navy Yard's
public space. The previous chapter discussed the worries some
of the industrial and commercial tenants of the Navy Yard felt
at the prospect of residential development, due to the potential
for conflicts among users. Portraying the Navy Yard as a public
waterfront space, especially a heavily programmed public space
meant to draw many non-employee and non-resident visitors to
the site, has the potential to dramatically increase those conflicts.
It is unsurprising, then, that the Navy Yard puts on major events
relatively infrequently.
The Philadelphia Navy Yard features both natural and man-made
elements that contribute to the site's exclusivity and security.
As discussed in the second chapter, the move of the shipyard
from Front Street to the relatively remote League Island was
an intentional effort by the Navy to ensure the site was easy to
secure. As Joe Hare of Rhoads Industries pointed out, the Navy
Yard is a natural enclave and the water on three sides provides
a "perfect security system" (Hare 2012). In addition, there are
only two entrances by land, the main entrance on South Broad
and a second entrance to the west on 2 6 th Street, which is mainly
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used by commercial vehicles to access the shipyard
and other industrial facilities in that section of
the site. The main entrance features a prominent
booth at which a security guard is posted (Figure
4.5). The security of the site is seen differently by
the industrial tenants and by the development
promoters. Joe Hare is happy that, "in order to be
here, you need a reason to be here. If they want to,
they can increase security at the front gate in a snap.
There's no place else in the city where you can do
that" (Hare, Joe 2012). John Grady of PIDC, on the
other hand, thinks the security system is gradually
"melting away." He points out that when PIDC originally took
over from the Navy, the Navy wanted armed guards manning the
entrance, but that PIDC pushed back. The fortress image was not
what they wanted to project. Now the booth at the entrance is
known as a "visitor service" place, and they only stop people from
entering at night and on weekends to combat illegal dumping and
vandalism (Grady, John 2012). With such divergent aspirations
for the site from its tenants and owners, it is unlikely conflict on
degrees of security desired will go away.
The other vital element shaping the public accessibility of the
Navy Yard is transportation, specifically the provision of parking
and the possibility of subway expansion. One is of course related
to either, and both have profound implications for the design,
image, and use of the site. Currently, the nearest SEPTA subway
stop is Pattison on the Broad Street line, which serves the sports
stadia, and is over a mile from the main entrance. It is not
surprising, then, that only about 5% of the employees at the Navy
Yard commute by transit (Berson, Brian 2012). The vast majority
The Main Entrance to the Navy Yard
(Author's Photo)
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Figure 4.6 One of Many Parking Lots w
Yard (Author's Photo)
drives. A study was done in 2008 to determine the feasibility of
extending the subway into the Navy Yard, but that possibility is
still years from becoming a reality (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2008,
4). In the meantime, Liberty Property Trust has developed a
shuttle system that will run every fifteen minutes from the Market
East Station, thus connecting the Navy Yard to the commuter
rail. The shuttle system was a requirement of Liberty's deal with
GlaskoSmithKline, but Mr. Berson anticipates that it will be
heavily used by URBN employees. He also is optimistic that the
improved connection to downtown will help lure other types of
businesses, like law firms, which have been reluctant to move
to a site that requires three modes of transit to reach from the
suburbs (Berson, Brian 2012). Importantly, the shuttle system
is designed primarily for employees coming to the Navy Yard
to work. It will operate only on weekdays. Mr. Berson does not
anticipate that it will lead to a much higher number of visitors to
the site. Without improved transit options, especially for evening
and weekend times, it is unlikely that the Navy Yard will become
a popular destination for the general public, regardless of the
quality or quantity of its public spaces.
Even when the shuttle is adopted, Liberty does
not expect to increase the percentage of transit
commuters much over 10%. Thus parking will
remain a vital element of the site's accessibility
(Figure 4.6). Mr. Wyatt acknowledged that the
update to the Master Plan is heavily influenced
by parking requirements of the new development
planned, calling the design of the revised Marina
ithin the Navy District "a totally parking-driven solution" (Wyatt,
Graham 2012). New development in the Navy Yard
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requires 3.5 parking spaces for every 1,000 square feet of office
space, which is on the low-end of mandates typical of suburban
office parks. Interestingly, these minimums are determined not
by zoning mandated by the City but by tenant expectations
(ibid). In fact, the City has been extremely flexible with its
zoning requirements in the Navy Yard. URBN, for example, was
permitted to substantially reduce its required parking spaces,
and was allowed to renovate a 55,000 square foot warehouse
with only 40 parking spaces. Yet Mr. Ziel questioned whether
this leniency was appropriate, given that driving is practically the
only means for Navy Yard employees to get to work (Ziel, Dave
2012). There is some tension, then, between efforts to encourage
development through permissive requirements and the practical
necessities of an employment district. In the updated Master
Plan, Mr. Wyatt and his fellow designers at Stern have attempted
to mitigate some of the negative externalities of the necessary
parking (including their unattractiveness and stormwater runoff
issues) by incorporating landscaped bio-swales throughout the
proposed new surface lots. In a multi-functional place like the
Navy Yard, parking itself becomes multi-functional: supplying
additional landscaping for the pastoral park, providing necessary
access for work, and helping to remediate its own environment
impact. Yet the significant space parking lots take up and their
primary use for commuters precludes the development of more
public open space meant for active recreation.
The 2004 Master Plan outlines ambitious goals for open space
in the Navy Yard, acknowledging its value to development, but
also committing to open space for public recreation and for
environmental protection and remediation. Yet to date, public
space development within the Navy Yard has been limited to
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that which surrounds new businesses and its design recalls a
suburban office park more than an urban destination. Mr. Wyatt
admitted as much when he acknowledged that the numerous
parks built and planned for the Navy Yard are meant to be used
by the employees of the businesses located there; they were not
designed primarily as destinations for the wider public. Further
illuminating the thought-process behind the scale and design of
the public spaces in the Navy Yard, Mr. Wyatt explained:
"One of the challenges of designing these spaces
is that they have to be economically viable too, so
you have to find some reasonable balance between
the capital cost of building them and the value
they create from a real estate perspective, and
then you also have to think about maintaining
them. So although its nice to have parks, what we
have tried to do is get the maximum value from
the minimum size park" (Wyatt, Graham 2012).
The ongoing development and adaptation of the Master Plan for
the Navy Yard reflects the tensions inherent in the integration
of multiple waterfront forms and roles: if it is to be primarily a
place of work and business, the goal of complete public access
and enjoyable public amenities may be difficult to achieve. In
many ways, the priorities demonstrated by PIDC when it comes
to public space design reflect the demands of the global capital
market. PIDC is a quasi-public agency, yet the purpose of the
Navy Yard is primarily private. Even festive waterfronts that
use public space to generate capital gains for private developers
offer a form of public-ness not available at the Navy Yard. But
perhaps this is not a bad thing. The ubiquity of public access in
waterfronts across the United States has made it more difficult
to maintain those waterfronts as industrial zones for water-
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dependent enterprises. The Philadelphia Naval Yard offers
an alternative model that leverages the positive attributes of a
waterfront location for a less public but more economically
diverse and productive environment.
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CHAPTER 5:
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED
WATERFRONT
This thesis began with two questions about contemporary
waterfront redevelopment practices: Can a city effectively
integrate industrial use, new capital investment, and public open
space on its waterfront through specific regulations and site
design? And does this form of waterfront redevelopment present
a viable and meaningful alternative to the standard development
models of the past? These questions flowed from an analysis of
four existing waterfront models and their inherent drawbacks.
By closely examining the redevelopment of the Philadelphia
Navy Yard, which sought in some ways to transcend these
standard forms, the research shows that significant challenges
remain for the integration of multiple functions and forms on
the waterfront. However, the case also reveals some of the value
generated in the attempt to break away from existing models.
After revisiting the research questions, this concluding chapter
argues that the preceding analysis exposes three overarching
challenges of the integrated waterfront: mitigating conflicts in a
mixed-use environment; reconciling the use of public space for
private benefit; and designing edges within the site to minimize
separation and uniformity. It also offers suggestions for ways in
which this research might be adapted or expanded in the future,
to explore some of the questions raised in more detail. Finally, the
chapter concludes by revisiting the definition of the integrated
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waterfront offered in the beginning of the thesis and assessing its
viability as a future redevelopment model.
REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Can a city effectively integrate industrial use, new
capital investment, and public open space on its
waterfront through specific regulations and site
design?
The preceding chapters proved that while the Navy Yard provides
space for each of these uses, they are not well integrated with
one another. In attempting to achieve multiple goals for the Navy
Yard, PIDC used the existing infrastructure and architecture
of the site strategically, to allow for the maximum number
and types of businesses while ensuring the minimum amount
of conflict between them. Public open space has been used to
anchor development and separate uses, and its design has not
been geared toward bringing in outsiders. The size of the site
and the relative sparseness of existing building stock allowed
for this separation of uses and the flexible adaptation of the site
for its various clients. It is attractive for both water-dependent
and related industrial businesses and other non-industrial
businesses, both because of site-specific amenities and because
of particular economic policies PIDC has employed. Whether
it will be as attractive for residents, and whether their presence
will have the desired affect of bringing more commercial
amenities is to be seen. It is possible that, just as the success of the
commercial development within the Navy Yard led to a scaling
back of planned public space along the waterfront, that successful
residential development will lead PIDC to revisit its treatment of
public space in general and the waterfront in particular.
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Does this form of waterfront redevelopment
present a viable and meaningful alternative to the
standard development models of the past?
The Philadelphia Navy Yard has not accomplished the goal of the
integrated waterfront in the way that I (and PIDC in its Master
Plan) envisioned it, at least at this point in its development. The
preceding chapters reveal three primary challenges to achieving
the integrated waterfront at the Navy Yard: overcoming the
conflicts of a mixed-use environment, using public land for
private benefit, and designing edges within the site to minimize
rather than emphasize separation and uniformity. Despite the
mixed success of the Navy Yard in overcoming these challenges,
the case proves that there is a waterfront development model that
is not beholden to the public destination image of the waterfront
that is so dominant in recent waterfront planning efforts. And
in that way, it helps to diversify our understanding of what the
waterfront can be.
MITIGATING CONFLICTS IN MIXED-USE
ENVIRONMENTS
The standard forms of waterfronts described in the introduction
- the forgotten, post-industrial waterfront; the industrial
employment center; the pastoral, passive public park; and the
festive, recreation destination - each allow for only one dominant
use. These forms of waterfronts are reflective of mid-Century
urban planning that embraced a strict separation of uses through
zoning, as well as the monotony of appearance and use that it
engenders. In the past fifteen to twenty years, however, those
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planning ideals have shifted. Movements like New Urbanism,
inspired by Jane Jacobs' writings from the 1960s that celebrated
the spontaneity and vibrancy of traditional New York City
neighborhoods, have brought "mixed use" into vogue in planning
and development circles. When the 2004 Master Plan states that
"the Navy Yard should develop, over time, as an urban mixed-use
community, active 24 hours a day and 7 days a week" it expresses
an intention popular in many, possibly all, redevelopment
projects of recent years (PIDC 2004, 3). While this was the first
planning principle listed in the Master Plan, efforts undertaken
by PIDC and its partners since the Plan's release indicate a
more singular vision of the space, one dominated by corporate
use. These efforts include offering a range of financing options
and tax incentives for new firms, providing business-friendly
landscaping and infrastructure, and scaling back plans for more
significant residential and recreational waterfront components.
The challenges of the mixed-use environment are greatest when
trying to integrate traditional industrial and manufacturing uses
with contemporary expectations for access and attractiveness.
As the value of the waterfront has grown, water-dependent uses,
like shipping or commercial fishing are increasingly threatened;
the waterfront now encompasses not only production and
transportation, but also consumption and recreation. In some
cases the latter has come to fully supplant the former. Most
waterfront dependent uses have very specific infrastructural
needs (large dry docks, piers, cranes, etc.) that are not friendly to
a publicly accessible waterfront design. Despite the popularity of
the consumption-based waterfront, some cities are attempting to
protect the water-dependent industrial uses and support the value
they bring to maintaining a diverse economy. The Designated
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Port Area in which the Boston Marine Industrial Park lies, for
example, is protected by law as a zone for water-dependent uses.
This preserves the working waterfront, but also has the effect
of isolating these areas. In this way it adheres strongly to the
industrial employment center standard waterfront form.
In some aspects, the Philadelphia Navy Yard follows this model.
The shipyard, which features significant and specific industrial
infrastructure and is the most explicitly water-dependent
use within the Navy Yard, is separated from the commercial
and potential residential districts, as well as from the public
waterfront elements like the esplanade. Indeed, the shipyard was
excluded from direct consideration in the 2004 Master Plan. Yet
the shipyard is inextricable from the rest of the Navy Yard, not
only due to its contributions to the diversity of the economic
base of the site, but also in the value it gives to the surrounding
development. The shipyard's industrial presence has become
a central part of the appeal of the site, even for non-industrial
tenants. As Mr. Berson of Liberty Property Trust put it:
"One of the things people love about the Navy
Yard is the juxtaposition of visual imagery and
context. So you have our new office buildings and
you can go out on the balcony and look past the
old officer's home - these charming, mansard roof
brick buildings - and then you can see the basin
with the ships and beyond the basins you see the
shipyard and industrial component and you put
all that together and it's not messy, it's exciting
and so I think people like it." (Berson 2012)
The industrial shipyard is thus an important visual component of
the site and integral to its identity, despite the physical barriers
in place that make it physically inaccessible to a visitor or non-
shipyard Navy Yard worker. In this way, the Navy Yard has found
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a way to bring the industrial waterfront out of isolation without
sacrificing its productivity or security.
RECONCILING PUBLICLY OWNED PRIVATE SPACE
The Navy Yard has developed into a site that both traditional
maritime industrial firms and service-sector business find
attractive, yet it is still far from the "urban mixed-use community"
it envisioned in the 2004 Master Plan. The most conspicuous
element missing from the Navy Yard is residential; without it, the
activity of the site is limited to working hours, not the 24-hour-
a-day/7-day-a-week vibrancy advocated in the Plan. Both
PIDC and Liberty Property Trust support the lifting of the deed
restriction on residential use within the Navy Yard, yet they have
pursued the option fairly slowly. Likewise, the public spaces that
have received the most investment so far are those that anchor
commercial real estate development - Crescent Park, the URBN
campus, even the re-design and landscaping of the street network.
The waterfront esplanade, meanwhile, is still under construction.
Finally, PIDC and Liberty are making significant revisions to the
design and purpose of the Marina District, changing it from a
recreation destination for the city with surrounding residential
uses to another commercial office zone. All of these decisions
are indicative of the first priority of PIDC and its partners for
the Navy Yard: (re)establish it as place of employment which can
compete with suburban office parks that have lured away much
of the city's corporate tax base. This goal is not necessarily a bad
one, but it does beg the question of how and why publicly owned
land is developed and used for private gain.
In the case of the Navy Yard, many of the elements that contribute
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to it feeling like a private rather than public space are a result of
its former use. As an active military base, the separation from the
rest of the city and the limited access points were essential to its
purpose; the forms of the navy yard were so dominant, including
both its structures and its gated nature, that repurposing them is
extremely difficult. This attempt to overcome the existing form -
through adaption, re-appropriation, or destruction - is relevant
to many waterfront redevelopment projects, which often face
particular infrastructural or historical impediments to their
immediate integration with the rest of the city.
DESIGNING EDGES TO MINIMIZE SEPARATION AND
UNIFORMITY
As the previous analysis indicated, the transformation of
the Philadelphia Navy Yard into a mixed-use community is
both helped and hindered by its previous use as a naval base.
The infrastructure and architecture make it attractive to a
diverse range of businesses, from an industrial shipbuilding
conglomerate to a trendy clothing retailer. Yet it is cut off from
the rest of the city by freeways and railroads. More troubling, the
development plan for the Navy Yard emphasizes the separation
of uses through the division of the site into districts. The site
is thus characterized by hard, impenetrable edges that serve
to emphasize rather than minimize the separation of uses and
uniformity of design. One way in which these separations could
be lessened, even without sacrificing the divisions that businesses
desire for security, is to redesign the edges to be more variable
and interesting. There three sections of the site where the edges
are particularly impenetrable and unchanging (Figure 5.1). One,
the northern boundary is necessarily impermeable, given the rail
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Figure 5.1 Major Edges within the Navy Yard
(PIDC 2004, with author's additions)
Figure 5.2 Edge Condition of the Shipyard
(Author's Photo)
Figure 5.3 Alternative Fencing Example
(www.demakersvan.com)
yard and highway on the other side. But the other
two, the shipyard edge and the waterfront edge,
could be significantly improved by some relatively
minor design interventions.
Due to the safety and security concerns of the
businesses that operate in the shipyard, access to the
area is restricted. While the side ofthe street adjacent
to the historic core and the corporate center is
permeable and landscaped, the side adjacent to the
shipyard is simply a chain-link fence (Figure 5.2).
Rather than treat this edge as an afterthought, PIDC
should take advantage of the interest in industrial
activity to create a more engaging demarcation. As
the quote from Mr. Berson used above indicates,
there is value in maintaining some accessibility -
visual, if not physical - to the industrial, working
waterfront. PIDC could emphasize this attraction
by using creative materials to form the barrier.
Using imaginative fencing or unusual landscaping
techniques could make the edge appear more
permeable than it is without sacrificing the security
demanded by the businesses within (Figure 5.3).
The waterfront edge is the second important edge
within the Navy Yard. In the 2004 Master Plan, PIDC
outlined two distinct waterfront edge conditions.
In the Marina district, the edge incorporated a
boardwalk and constructed wetlands, with a soft
sloping edge (Figure 5.4). The concept for the
riverfront esplanade featured a multi-use trail with
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a constructed edge and permanent fixed guardrail
(Figure 5.5). PIDC's decision to abandon the marina
district should not limit the 2+ miles of water's
edge in the Navy Yard to an unvarying waterfront
path. Indeed, even if PIDC does intend to main
the hard seawall edge along the entire waterfront
(as Graham Wyatt indicated), there are a number
of options for how the location might be made
more valuable and environmentally responsive
by incorporating diverse design elements. Three
possibilities are described below:
Figure 5.4 Waterfront Edge in Proposed Marina
District (PIDC 2004, 49)
Figure 5.5 Waterfront Edge along Riverfront
Esplanade (PIDC 2004, 82)
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Edge 1: Theater-style (Figures 5.6 and 5.7)
. Hard seawall maintained, but brought close to water's
level (at highest tide)
. Seating and fishing areas incorporated on different
levels
. Dynamic interaction with the water provided for
visitors
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Edge 2: Boardwalk (Figures 5.8 and 5.9)
. Hard seawall maintained with ramps to parallel
boardwalk
. Winding boardwalk provides variable waterfront
experience and access to water
- Space for ecological wetlands; could incorporate
some public education element
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Edge 3: Rocky Edge (Figures 5.10 and 5.11)
. Hard seawall maintained
. Rocky sloping edge that can support plant life,
diversify river ecology
. Makes tidal changes more visible; could incorporate
some public education element
90
These three possibilities are neither exhaustive nor mutually
exclusive. Ideally they would be combined in some form in order
to ensure a variation of materials, patterns, and experiences
along the waterfront trail. The point is merely to illustrate that
the most important public amenity of the site should be treated
with sensitivity and creativity, and that such an investment is
possible even without transforming the waterfront into the
festival destination.
POTENTIAL FUTURE RESEARCH
The redevelopment of the Philadelphia Navy Yard operated
under a set of specific conditions and circumstances that make
it somewhat difficult to apply its lessons to potential future
redevelopment projects. The wave of military base closures in the
past two decades provided cities with an unprecedented amount
of publicly owned land to repurpose as they chose. Without that
kind of significant land exchange, it is unlikely that cities will
have the kind of opportunity Philadelphia had to experiment
with such a large and cohesive site. With that in mind, it is useful
to consider how this study of a particular, and perhaps unique,
waterfront redevelopment project might inspire and inform
future research efforts.
The Philadelphia Navy Yard is an ongoing development project.
As this research has revealed, the intended use and design of
the site has undergone significant transformation over the past
two decades. It is more than likely that this pattern of responsive
adaptation of the site's purpose and configuration will continue.
Certainly it would be worth revisiting this research when/if the
deed restriction on residential development is lifted. Does the
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addition of residential use stimulate the development of other
commercial amenities, as PIDC and Liberty Property Trust
anticipate? How does the addition of permanent residents
affect the form and operation of the site, particularly the size,
scope, and programming of public space? Such a study might be
particularly valuable as other single-use sites, such as suburban
office parks, begin to accommodate other uses and must adapt
their site plans accordingly.
In terms of waterfront redevelopment more broadly, this
research suggests that there is still value in maintaining the
waterfront for water-dependent industrial uses. Yet even as some
of the smaller manufacturing firms within the Navy Yard have
seen their business expand, Kvaerner, the shipbuilding firm, has
needed near continuous financial support from the public. How
will the Navy Yard adapt if the shipyard portion fails? Can it be
repurposed and integrated into the rest of the site? What would
this mean for the many smaller manufacturing businesses within
the site, and for the blue-collar workforce more generally? Some
cities and states have put regulatory controls in place to protect
the working waterfront, such as the Designated Port Areas in
Massachusetts or New York City's recent adoption of Vision202O
for their waterfront, which includes an explicit goal of protecting
maritime uses. A more focused study on whether cities and states
should maintain industrial uses, even under adverse economic
conditions, and if so how they can accomplish this would be
worthwhile.
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THE FUTURE OF THE INTEGRATED WATERFRONT
In the introduction to this thesis, I offered an alternative to
the four standard waterfront forms that have made waterfront
redevelopment projects so monotonous. I called this the
integrated waterfront, and argued that it offers more diverse
understanding of what the waterfront can be. By blending
elements of the forgotten, working, open, and festive waterfront
models, the integrated waterfront has the potential to be place
of discovery, creation, and enjoyment. It allows the multiple
advantages of the waterfront to benefit an equally wide range
of users. It is thus a valuable alternative to the standard forms
because it offers both a diversity of economic functions and
urban place-making amenities. The Philadelphia Navy Yard,
as it has developed over the past two decades, reveals both the
inherent challenges of this model and its potential. Rather than
using the advantages of the waterfront to serve the broadest cross-
section of Philadelphia's community, the Navy Yard's waterfront
is used primarily to add value to industrial and corporate office
development. Likewise, there is not a perfect balance, in terms
of allocated space or desegregated design, among the different
uses; uses are still separated from one another physically and the
site design is uninspired, recalling too easily the suburban office
parks it wants to replace. Finally, while new capital investment
has been a bigger priority for PIDC and its partners than either
industrial development or public open space provision, the
Philadelphia Navy Yard is more economically diverse than most
waterfronts. After more than a decade of redevelopment and
investment, the number of workers employed at the Navy Yard
has surpassed the number it had when it closed as a naval base in
the early 1990s; more importantly, those workers are employed
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in a range of industries and sectors, including traditional
manufacturing, creative production, and high-technology
research and development, which is promising for the long term
economic growth of the Navy Yard and the city of Philadelphia.
The mixed success of the Navy Yard suggests not only the
challenges of the integrated waterfront model, but also the
limitations of planning more generally. Planning is often thought
of as an anticipatory act: planners organize a site in order to
achieve a certain expected vision. The 2004 Master Plan certainly
fulfills that role. It envisioned a future for the 1200-acre waterfront
site that was substantially different from its then-current state: a
mixed-use, vibrant community that would serve a broad cross-
section of users. The Plan articulated a wide range of goals -
sustain the traditional shipyard, bring in new commercial capital
investment, and create a waterfront destination for the city. Yet
the plan failed to anticipate how the success of one of these goals
might impede the realization of the others. The primary goal of
PIDC and its partners was always to grow the Navy Yard as a
place for jobs and so they prioritized commercial development
over other waterfront functions. They sacrificed the vision of the
Plan to respond to the market. The forthcoming update to the
Master Plan is responsive, rather than anticipatory, and therefore
friendlier to the capital-driven American development context.
Waterfront redevelopment over the past half-century has
resulted in a series of places that look and function alike, such
that each successive project is expected to fit within the existing
paradigms. Because the waterfront is such a powerful place - "the
most visible space for the creation of meaning" as one waterfront
scholar argued - restricting its physical form and economic
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function is severely limiting for the city's growth and identity.
The purpose of the integrated waterfront is to allow one of the
most visible and powerful spaces of the city to have a diversity
of meanings. While the Philadelphia Navy Yard has not wholly
met this goal, its continuing development shows its potential for
future waterfront developments.
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